Despite the drumbeat, the empirical case for antitrust remains weak. We know that polio vaccine effectively eradicated polio; we do not know that the antitrust laws have made us better off. Twenty years ago, George Stigler wrote: “There have been no persuasive studies of the effects of the Sherman and Clayton Acts throughout this century.” Little has changed. The antitrust experts may be having fun, but the clothes they have draped on the emperor are threadbare at best.

MAGNA CARTA OR POLITICS AS USUAL?

One myth needs immediate debunking: Antitrust law was not a response to textbook monopoly. Rather, it was a response to disruptive technologies and new forms of business that arrived thick and fast in the late nineteenth century. For example, centralized meatpackers put local slaughterhouses under competitive pressure after the invention of the refrigerated railcar. Similarly, Standard Oil pioneered the use of tank cars to transport petroleum, putting pressure on refiners that shipped oil in barrels. Analogous stories played themselves out in dozens of industries. In a seeming paradox, firms in those industries often formed “trusts,” “pools,” and other cartel-like arrangements.

Many of the classic “trust” industries also pioneered the modern corporate form. When Congress passed the Sherman Act in July of 1890, fear of disruption, low prices, and new, larger forms of business organization were as much in the air as fear of high prices. Tellingly, Congress passed the McKinley Tariff (with a rate of almost 50 percent) only a few months earlier — the opposite of what one would expect from a champion of consumer welfare.

A second myth also requires attention. The courts have not interpreted antitrust law – whatever its origins – selflessly and in a political vacuum. Rather, they respond to political pressure and, like all bureaucracies, protect their turf. For example, the Supreme Court originally viewed the Sherman Act as inappli-

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The Antitrust Emperor’s Clothes

We need to base policy on what we know.
cable to acquisitions via stock purchases. After Teddy Roosevelt attacked an unpopular railroad consolidation, it narrowly reversed itself in 1904. Similarly, the court created the per se rule against price fixing in the mid-1890s, but abandoned it just months before passage of the 1933 National Industrial Recovery Act, which encouraged industry-wide agreements. In 1950, Congress closed a loophole in merger law, but did so against background rhetoric about a “rising tide of concentration.” The courts listened and came down hard on mergers.

Halting business Antitrust enforcement is capable of affecting economic activity, and it seems to respond to economic conditions. The most dramatic example involves Teddy Roosevelt. His attack on Standard Oil and other large corporations coincided with the Panic of 1907, and Roosevelt’s critics, and indeed many of his friends, claimed that his attacks caused the panic. It was not a farfetched charge — a wildly popular president threatened to dismantle the country’s largest corporations and send top corporate officers to jail. In 1911, President William Howard Taft’s pursuit of U.S. Steel also coincided with a recession and similar charges. In fact, Taft conceded that his policies “may make business halt.”

In the late 1930s, the failure of the economy to come out of the Great Depression led the FDR administration to charge that the “bottlenecks of business” — large corporations and their allegedly anti-competitive practices — prevented recovery. The result was Thurman Arnold’s legendary antitrust campaign and the Temporary National Economic Condition (TNEC) hearings. Ironically, the attack coincided with the 1938 recession-within-a-depression.

Stepped-up enforcement also occurs at the end of protracted booms; in fact, it helps explain why booms end. Examples include Teddy Roosevelt’s trust busting after the late-1890s expansion and Hoover’s revival of antitrust in 1929 amid cries of “profitless prosperity” from declining sectors. Antitrust revivals also occurred at the end of the 1980s and again at the end of the 1990s.

Economic pain, either from a stagnant business climate or from the dislocations and envy of a tumultuous boom, may generate stepped-up attacks on business, especially successful business. Disruptive antitrust cases may cause a decline in business spending. Finally, stepped-up attacks on business may simply be a collateral symptom of bad economic policies. None of those possibilities offers support for aggressive enforcement.

FROM WIN-BUTTONS TO MEGA-MERGERS

The most conspicuous economic problem in the 1970s was inflation. It provoked a variety of non-monetary policy responses, some harmful, some merely comic. The responses included wage and price controls under Richard Nixon, “Whip Inflation Now” Win-buttons under Gerald Ford, and the “Tax-

Both books took the then-controversial view that the antitrust laws should promote economic efficiency or consumer welfare, rather than protect small traders and wayward men besieged by more efficient organizations. Both books also employed a crisp intellectual approach.

The courts also began to reverse some of the restrictive holdings of the 1950s, ’60s, and early ’70s. Ronald Reagan’s victory in 1980 gave new momentum to laissez-faire policies. Reagan’s appointment of William Baxter to head the DOJ’s Antitrust Division and James Miller to chair the FTC moved the agencies in a new direction.

By any measure, 1982 was the watershed year. In January, the Department of Justice abandoned the IBM case and signed a consent decree with AT&T, stipulating a voluntary divestiture. The FTC’s Antitrust Paradox dropped its “shared monopoly” case against the cereals. The new generation of aca-

“...The mathematical models-driven approach of the 1990s was flexible to a fault and could explain any business behavior as anti-competitive...”
The shift in policies in the early 1980s offers a natural experiment with a clear result: Merger activity picked up. For example, a series of mergers previously unimaginable changed the face of the oil industry. T. Boone Pickens drove calcified Gulf Oil into the arms of Chevron, and Texaco acquired Getty Oil in 1984.

N. F. Buttingmyr

Related developments—in particular changes in takeover law and the development of junk bond financing—contributed to the merger wave and also encouraged management buyouts and leveraged buyouts. The most visible deal was Kohlberg Kravis Roberts’s $31 billion leveraged buyout of RJR Nabisco in 1988, an event later portrayed in unflattering detail in the book Barbarians at the Gate and in a movie starring James Garner. The buyouts contributed to our understanding of how changes in control can improve economic and financial performance. Additionally, though the other transactions did not raise traditional antitrust flags, they provided fuel for the coming political reaction to mergers and other forms of restructuring. The simultaneous appearance of less stringent merger policy; a merger boom, and an economic boom is a familiar pattern in U.S. history. Outright suspension of merger enforcement in the late 1890s and effective suspension in the mid- and late 1920s under Coolidge coincided with a merger wave and an economic boom. That raises the possibility that a generous merger policy is good for the economy. Clearly, other related developments had an influence on the economic climate of the 1980s, chief among them the decline in the inflation rate. But given historical experience, it seems unwise to rule out merger policy.

Several mechanisms are possible. Henry Manne’s 1965 article “Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control” argues that companies in the same industry are in the best position to identify and run poorly managed firms. Horizontal mergers and the possibility of takeover would increase output and the value of existing assets. To the same effect, Lester Telscher views mergers as facilitating the transfer of intangible capital across firms. Removing the obstacles to transfers leads to greater output. Finally, a less restrictive merger environment opens up more exit strategies for firms, thus increasing entry, investment, and firm value. Although some critics claim that 1980s merger policy was too lax, there is no systematic body of evidence showing that consumers were harmed.

**The Antitrust Empire Strikes Back**

Antitrust lawyers complained about Reagan’s antitrust policies from their very inception, and they have consistently lobbied for stricter enforcement. Tellingly, they did not argue that restrained enforcement made consumers demonstrably worse off; rather, they wanted policy that was less “ideological” and that “enforced the law” by filing types of cases that the Reagan officials ignored. Milton Handler, an influential antitrust lawyer whose career spanned six decades, complained about the “lawlessness of this administration,” saying, “The government is not merely failing to enforce the law; it is changing it unilaterally.” Ira Millstein incongruously complained, “Business in general feels that no one is going to enforce the antitrust laws anymore. That makes counseling and voluntary compliance with the law much more difficult.” Without enforcement, counseling and compliance are not unnecessary. A former Democratic antitrust official, perhaps hoping for more business, called the Reagan administration’s record “nothing short of pitiful.” Thomas Krattenmaker and Robert Pitofsky lambasted the Reagan administration’s antitrust record because it had challenged very few of “an unprecedented wave of mergers.” Separately, Pitofsky conceded that those facts alone did not prove or imply that merger enforcement had been misguided.

The American Bar Association summarized the complaints of antitrust lawyers in a 1989 task force report on antitrust enforcement that requested more resources for the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, an end to the division’s advocacy of reform, and an end to “non-enforcement rhetoric.” The report urged more case filings, more monopolization cases, and more vertical-restraints cases, without the least evidence that consumers had been hurt.

Congress was also unhappy with less stringent enforcement and the wave of mergers. Senator Paul Simon (D-Ill.) complained in hearings on the Antitrust Division that “antitrust lawyers are closing up shop,” seemingly oblivious to possible upsides. On a related front, the House Ways and Means Committee approved anti-takeover legislation and then backpedaled when the proposal was implicated as a precipitating factor in the October 1987 stock market crash— a suspicion later confirmed in academic research.

**Billable hours**

In the late 1980s, newly elected President George H. W. Bush installed a group of antitrust officials who signaled “more vigorous enforcement.” He appointed James Rill, a 25-year veteran of the antitrust bar, to head the Antitrust Division. Sen. Howard Metzenbaum, a critic of Reagan-era enforcement, hailed the appointment as “a signal that President Bush intends to break stride with his predecessor.” Bush also appointed Janet Steger, formerly chair of the Postal Rate Commission, to chair the FTC. She also offered tougher talk.

Cases and investigations soon followed. In many instances, the harm to consumers from challenged business behavior was speculative at best. The DOJ filed a case against the Ivy League colleges in 1989, claiming that their “Overlap Group” financial aid practices represented a restraint of trade. Twenty schools had agreed to offer identical financial aid packages to commonly accepted students. Upper-middle class parents of very good students were hurt, but plausibly students with less affluent parents were helped. Because the challenged arrangement involved price discrimination by a non-profit, the question of who benefited was a little slippery. (One wag suggested that monopoly gains were helped. Because the challenged arrangement involved price discrimination by a non-profit, the question of who benefited was a little slippery. (One wag suggested that monopoly gains went to administrator salaries.) On any view, elimination of the Overlap Group agreements merely represented a reshuffling of the extensive price discrimination and cross-subsidization that universities of all types continue to practice.

The Justice Department also began an investigation of airline pricing in 1989 that culminated in a December 1992 case filing. The allegation was “price-fixing,” but the airlines had no meeting of the minds. Rather, they had merely posted current and future prices on airline reservation systems, an ambiguous practice at worst.
Mere investigations without filings also send signals. In the “keiretsu” probes, both antitrust agencies moved beyond consumer protection by looking at arrangements in Japan that allegedly kept U.S. auto suppliers from doing business there. The Washington Post called the probe “loopy and dangerous.” A spike in oil prices accompanying Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait led to the inevitable DOJ investigation of the oil industry, though the industry had been turned inside out and found clean several times over the preceding two decades.

The FTC pursued high tech targets, investigating both Microsoft and Intel. It eventually dropped the Microsoft investigation, and its interest in Intel resulted in a 1999 settlement and a second investigation that the agency dropped in 2000. The FTC filed a case against infant formula makers in 1991 that was reminiscent of 1970s “shared monopoly” suits. Two defendants settled. The third, Abbott, was vindicated in court in 1994.

The FTC also returned to filing vertical-restraints cases, charging swimming pool equipment maker Kreepy Krauly with “price fixing” because it sought to prevent discounting of its pool vacuum cleaners. The market for swimming pool vacuums is hardly a prime candidate for monopolization, and an excellent candidate for the “special services argument.” Point-of-sale promotion is hard to charge for, and discounters can easily free-ride on the promotional efforts of full-price retailers. The FTC joined state attorneys general in charging Nintendo with “price fixing” in a case settled in 1991. The agency later dropped a separate investigation of Nintendo’s product design and licensing practices. In each instance, the case for antitrust action was speculative and eminently susceptible to critique. Perhaps more importantly, the cases plausibly signaled to business that the agencies had become or were about to become untethered again, as they had been in the 1970s and at other times. Conceptually, it was not a big leap from the investigations’ actual cases filed under the first Bush administration to the “shared monopoly” cases filed against the oil and cereal companies.

In general, the Bush administration’s domestic policy apparatus appeared to be on automatic pilot, guided by Republican mandarins headed for the revolving door rather than by an overarching economic vision. In desperate straits, the Bush administration itself implicitly conceded the point when it imposed a “regulatory moratorium” in early 1992 ahead of the presidential election and at the bottom of the 1991-92 recession. If that downturn was a “regulatory recession” as some critics claimed, Bush’s antitrust authorities may have done their part to bring it on.

**BIPARTISAN CONSENSUS OR CONSPIRACY AGAINST THE PUBLIC?**

Bipartisan consensus on antitrust is the rule. Unfortunately, consensus is no guarantee against foolishness. In the 1912 election, both Woodrow Wilson and William Howard Taft took the view that the only good trust was a divested trust. The economy suffered until U.S. entry into World War I, when the Wilson administration backed off on business in return for help with the war effort. More recently, over the years that span from Eisenhower to Carter, both Republicans and Democrats pursued an aggressive policy, but the result was a policy few would defend and no one would work to recreate today.

Since the struggle to redirect policy in the 1980s, successive leaders in the antitrust agencies have again demonstrated a disturbing coziness. Antitrust officials write papers and give speeches with titles indicating an entrenched and sterile harmony: “The Essential Stability of Merger Policy in the United States” (FTC Commissioner Thomas B. Leary) and “Antitrust Enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission: In a Word – Continuity” (FTC Chairman Timothy J. Muris).

The consensus on antitrust arises from both fear and greed. The public fears monopoly, and rightly so. Consensus means neither major party looks soft on monopoly. A cop on the beat has appeal, even if the cop has no idea who the crooks are. Fear of monopoly is also easily exploited and diverted to serve private interests. In the 1970s, the antitrust cops went too far, pistol-whipping suspects at random. Although the antitrust bar prospered, political support eroded. The reforms of the 1980s showed how the consensus could be rebuilt. The party in power allows the antitrust bar to collect a large part of its implicit regulatory tax by guiding firms through a struc-
brought but complex merger review process and brokering con-
tents. Tamed antitrust also serves other constituents. For ex-
ample, Jesse Jackson’s Citizenship Education Fund initially opposed
the SBC/Ameritech deal but then shifted its position after SBC
made a $500,000 contribution to the fund and agreed to sell a
seven-percent share of its cellular operations to a black busi-
nessman. (The example is slightly flawed because Jackson
voiced his complaints at the Federal Communications Com-
mission.) The post-1982 merger process avoids the political
and economic costs of bitter battles over divestiture, still allows
various influential constituents to go in the loop, and keeps the
cop reassuringly on the beat.
Over time, the ratio of public fear to private greed has prob-
ably declined. We have learned to live with big business, and
– attorneys and economic consultants— are skeptical and argue
that the resulting analysis would be slippery and speculative.
A sound business reason for that position is that giving advice
and litigation support is fraught with hazard in an innovation
market. Additionally, enthusiastic application of the concept
may lead to a repeat of the “shared monopolies” fiasco and
political backlash of the 1970s.

Merger As advertised by the agencies, merger policy for
bread-and-butter mergers has been remarkably stable. Mer-
ger policy was particularly generous in the telecom area. The
proximate origin of that generosity was the 1996 Telecommu-
nications Act, which sought to encourage inter-modal com-
petition (say between telephone companies and cable TV com-
panies). A Washington insider’s view is that the Telecom Act
put Congress back in the loop and led to an inflow of campaign
contributions from the telecom companies. A succession of
large deals followed—the consolidation of the Baby Bells, large
cable acquisitions by AT&T and the AOL/Time Warner merg-
er, for example. The AOL/Time Warner merger raised no hor-
zontal issues, but entailed a large and politically sensitive ver-
tical merger. The “open access” debate was in full swing and
Internet service providers competing with AOL feared they
would be excluded from Time Warner’s cable-based broad-
band. Defense mergers also faced a low hurdle, with the
Defense Department often urging and even subsidizing con-
solidation in the industry. (The exception was the blocked
Lockheed Martin / Northrop Grumman merger opposed by
both the Defense Department and the DOJ.)

When the agencies opposed mergers, reasonable
observers could disagree about the prospective effects. The Just-
tice Department opposed Microsoft’s acquisition of Intuit even
though Microsoft agreed to divest its own money-management
software. The effects of the deal hinged on whether consumers
are better off having Microsoft’s deep pockets, execution skills,
and aggressive strategy behind the category leader at a time
when Internet banker was a possible “killer app.” The FTC
blocked Staples’ move to buy Office Depot although the two
jointly had less than six percent of the total office supply mar-
er. The strength of the FTC case depends on one’s willingness
to view office superstores as a separate market. When World-
Com proposed to merge with Sprint in the fall of 1999, fears
of monopoly in long-distance seemed quaint. They have
become quaintier still. The deal was in trouble at the European
Union, and U.S. antitrust authorities found an opportunity to
oppose a telecom deal without actually affecting its outcome.

We have seen by the examples of General Motors,
ITT, and U.S. Steel that market
dominance is not all that it was cracked up to be.

have seen by the examples of Microsoft, Wal-Mart, and Intel on
one hand, and General Motors, U.S. Steel, and ITT on the
other, that alleged dominance is not all it was cracked up to be.
In addition, with the secular increase in direct or indirect stock
ownership, an attack on business has become an attack on the
public. We have met the alleged monopolists, and they are us.
However, the contrary forces that led to the antitrust adventure
of the 1970s remain and have reasserted themselves. Starting
with the first Bush administration, both Republican and Demo-
cratic administrations have shown troubling initiative. New
and aggressive strategy behind the category leader at a time
when Internet banker was a possible “killer app.” The FTC
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Union, and U.S. antitrust authorities found an opportunity to
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Microsoft. The May 1998 case filing against Microsoft represented a return to large-firm monopolization cases. The Justice Department charged Microsoft with a variety of monopolistic practices, chief among them Microsoft’s effort to displace Netscape’s Navigator as the most popular Internet browser. In theory anything is possible, and the blackboard debate about the effects of Microsoft’s actions remains a stalemate. Microsoft is hard to love, but software and applications are winner-take-all products, so somebody had to be on top.

Off the blackboard, the facts favor the “anti-anti-Microsoft” view (Paul Krugman’s term). The government’s case was marred with political calculation and posturing. Strong political support came from California and Utah, home to major competitors to Microsoft, and participation of 18 state attorneys general complicated settlement and likely led to the proposed and ill-fated divestiture remedy. Taken as a package, the case generated uncertainty in the industry, consumed time and energy, and raised legitimate fears about where antitrust policy in general would go. (See “All the Facts that Fit,” Winter 1999.)

The stock market provides evidence for that view. Throughout the 1980s, antitrust actions directed against Microsoft pushed down not only Microsoft’s stock price, but also the stock prices of its putative victims. Setbacks for aggressive actions against Microsoft had the opposite effect, helping both Microsoft and the rest of the computer sector. That should have been a signal to the DOJ. Disaster struck in April 2000 when settlement talks collapsed and news leaked two weeks later that the government-plaintiffs would seek divestiture. NASDAQ shuddered and began a long descent. Tech stocks probably were oversold and over-believed, but the attempt to break up one of the big names was a totally unnecessary and costly blow. As in other historical episodes in which downturns and trust busting coincided, it is hard to quantify the financial and economic effects. But it seems unlikely that the Microsoft case has made the U.S. economy wealthier and more productive. (See “The Benefits of MS-Settlement,” Spring 2002.)

The Microsoft case also raises a riddle, discussed by Milton Friedman and others: Why does the business community support policies that seemingly have more long-term costs than short-term benefits?

THE END OF ANTITRUST HISTORY?

Antitrust policy over the last 25 years can claim substantial achievements. First, the stated terms of the debate have shifted to consumer welfare and efficiency, and away from vague and easily misused goals such as dispersion of political and economic power. Clearly, affirmation of the stated goals may still go hand-in-hand with the misuse of antitrust laws to dumbfounding competitors or extract tribute. Second, the 1982 and subsequent Merger Guidelines and the Hart-Scott-Rodino review process provide safe havens, comparative predictability, and effective protection against suits filed after a deal is done. Third, the agencies still file large-firm monopolization cases as illustrated by the Microsoft case, but they have done so less frequently. Taken as a whole, the 1980s shift yielded dividends. It helped slay the conglomerates, themselves partly the progeny of strict prohibitions against horizontal mergers in the 1950s and 60s. The policy shift also deserves credit for a more efficient corporate sector and quite plausibly an expanding, dynamic economy and a booming stock market. It does not appear to have caused or fostered monopoly.

The antitrust pendulum has swung back since the late 1980s, and a new bipartisan consensus has emerged under the Clinton and the two Bush administrations. The basic merger regime has remained stable, but other aspects of policy—notably large-firm monopolization cases—represent a partial return to the 1970s. That movement took place at the behest of identifiable private and political interests, in particular the private antitrust bar and the managers of aggrieved competitors, but benefits to the general public remain speculative. More gains are possible if we learn more about what antitrust policy has done in practice, rather than relying on the antitrust tailors to tell us what is fact and what is not.

READINGS