President Bush asserts that U.S. military action against Iraq was justified because Saddam Hussein was in material breach of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441. But even if Iraq was in violation of a UN resolution, the U.S. military does not exist to enforce UN mandates. It exists to defend the United States: its territorial integrity and national sovereignty, the population, and the liberties that underlie the American way of life. So whether Iraq was in violation of Resolution 1441 is irrelevant. The real question is whether Iraq represented a direct and imminent threat to the United States that could not otherwise be deterred. If that was the case, then preemptive self-defense, like Israel’s military action against Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq in the 1967 Six Day War, would have been warranted. And if Iraq was not a threat, especially in terms of aiding and abetting Al Qaeda, then the United States fought a needless war against a phantom menace.

In the final analysis, the war against Iraq was the wrong war. Not because the United States used preemptive military force—preemptive self-defense would have been justified in the face of a truly imminent threat. Not because the United States acted without the consent of the United Nations—no country should surrender its defense to a vote of other nations. And not because Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—none has been discovered and, even if they existed, they were not a threat.

The war against Iraq was the wrong war because the enemy at the gates was, and continues to be, Al Qaeda. Not only was Iraq not a direct military threat to the United States (even if it possessed WMD, which was a fair assumption), but there is no good evidence to support the claim that Saddam Hussein was in league with Al Qaeda and would have given the group WMD to be used against the United States. In fact, all the evidence suggests the contrary. Hussein was a secular Muslim ruler, and bin Laden is a radical Muslim fundamentalist—their ideological views are hardly compatible.

Ironically, President Bush provided his own indictment of the Iraq war when he addressed the United Nations General Assembly in September 2003: “No government should ignore the threat of terror, because to look the other way gives terrorists the chance to regroup and recruit and prepare.” But that is exactly what the United States did by going to war against Iraq. To make matters even worse, the American taxpayer is stuck with the bill for the war and postwar reconstruction.

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Even if Iraq was in violation of UN resolutions, the reality is that the United States military exists to defend the United States: its territorial integrity and national sovereignty, the population, and the liberties that underlie the American way of life.

Introduction

Standing aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln on May 1, 2003, President Bush declared an end to major combat operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom and told the members of the U.S. armed forces, “Because of you, our nation is more secure.” On September 7, 2003, Bush addressed the nation and declared, “Iraq is now the central front” in the war on terrorism. And on November 3, 2003, in Birmingham, Alabama, he said, “We are aggressively striking the terrorists in Iraq, defeating them there so we will not have to face them in our own country.” Those assertions are central to determining whether there was casus belli for the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

According to President Bush, Saddam Hussein’s material breach of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 was casus belli. But Resolution 1441 never really set forth grounds for military action, nor did it make clear that military action would be an explicit consequence of noncompliance. Even if Iraq was in violation of UN resolutions, the reality is that the United States military exists to defend the United States: its territorial integrity and national sovereignty, the population, and the liberties that underlie the American way of life. So the real question is whether Iraq represented a direct and imminent threat to the United States that could not otherwise have been deterred. If that was the case, then preemptive self-defense, like Israel’s military action against Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq in the 1967 Six Day War, would have been warranted. And if Iraq was not a threat, especially in terms of aiding and abetting Al Qaeda, then the United States fought a needless war against a phantom menace.

Changing the Focus from Al Qaeda to Iraq

That the administration changed course to focus its efforts on Iraq rather than Al Qaeda should come as no great surprise. In the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001, Iraq was already being discussed as an eventual target. According to Bob Woodward in Bush at War, at a National Security Council meeting on the afternoon of September 12, 2001: “[Secretary of Defense Donald] Rumsfeld raised the question of Iraq. Why shouldn’t we go against Iraq, not just Al Qaeda, he asked. Rumsfeld was speaking not only for himself when he raised the question. His deputy, Paul D. Wolfowitz, was committed to a policy that would make Iraq a principal target of the first round in the war on terrorism.” In fact, Wolfowitz argued that Iraq would be easier than Afghanistan. And five days later the president said: “I believe Iraq was involved, but I’m not going to strike them now. I don’t have the evidence at this point.”

Although military action against Iraq was put on hold to focus on Afghanistan, the wheels had been put in motion. Responding to Rumsfeld about a routine request to hit targets in the Iraqi no-fly zone, Bush said, “We have to be patient about Iraq.” So the administration’s shift of focus from Al Qaeda to Iraq evolved over time and in increments.

On September 20, 2001, before a joint session of Congress, President Bush addressed the American people and held Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda terrorist network responsible for the September 11 attacks. He also condemned the Taliban regime in Afghanistan for aiding and abetting Al Qaeda. Bush said, “Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them” and that the war on terrorism “will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.” Ostensibly, the only terrorist group with demonstrated global reach was (and still is) Al Qaeda.

In an October 2001 radio address to the nation, the rhetoric began to shift slightly and subtly when the president stated that “America is determined to oppose the state sponsors of terror” and that the “enemy is the terrorists themselves, and the regimes that shelter and sustain them.” And instead of a war against terrorist groups with global reach, Bush spoke of a “global campaign against terror.”
In a November 2001 Rose Garden ceremony welcoming back aid workers Heather Mercer and Dayna Curry rescued from Afghanistan, President Bush remarked: “If anybody harbors a terrorist, they’re a terrorist. If they fund a terrorist, they’re a terrorist. If they house terrorists, they’re terrorists. . . . If they develop weapons of mass destruction that will be used to terrorize nations, they will be held accountable.” Thus, the president linked the war on terrorism to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), claiming that countries that develop WMD were always part of his definition of terrorists. And he specifically said that Iraq needed to allow weapons inspectors back into the country. In response to a question about the consequences for Saddam Hussein if he did not allow inspectors into Iraq, Bush said, “He’ll find out,” which fueled speculation that the administration was planning military action against Iraq.

The rhetoric about rogue states and WMD was used again when President Bush addressed cadets at the Citadel in December 2001: “Rogue states are clearly the most likely sources of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons for terrorists.” And Bush was explicit about expanding the war on terrorism: “America’s next priority to prevent mass terror is to protect against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them.”

In his State of the Union address on January 29, 2002, President Bush did not make a single direct reference to either Al Qaeda or Osama bin Laden. Seemingly forgotten were previous comments about wanting bin Laden “dead or alive.” Instead, he stated that the United States would be “steadfast and patient and persistent in the pursuit of two great objectives. First, we will shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorists to justice. And second, we must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world.” The president specifically named Iraq (along with Iran and North Korea) as part of “an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world” and said that “by seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger.”

Yet little more than a week after the president included Iraq in the axis of evil, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that “Al Qaeda leaders still at large are working to reconstitute the organization and to resume its terrorist operations” and that the Al Qaeda terrorist network was still “the most immediate and serious threat” to the United States. A month later, Robert Mueller, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, stated, “We believe that we are still targeted, that there are Al Qaeda associates or individuals around the world and some in the United States that are intent on committing terrorist acts within the country.”

In spite of those warnings about the continued threat posed by Al Qaeda and despite the fact that the joint resolution passed by Congress in the wake of 9/11 was very specific about authorizing the president to respond “against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons,” the Al Qaeda terrorist network and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan—the president spent the rest of 2002 laying the groundwork for regime change in Iraq rather than focusing the war on terrorism against Al Qaeda.

**Iraqi Military Was Not a Real Threat**

According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies’ *Military Balance 2002–2003,* Iraq’s defense expenditures were $1.4 billion in 2001 (compared to U.S. defense spending of nearly $330 billion). Its army consisted of 350,000 troops (the vast majority of whom were ill-trained conscripts) and had 3 armored divisions, 3 mechanized divisions, and 11 infantry divisions, as well as 6 Republican Guard divisions and 4 Special Republican Guard brigades. But despite the Iraqi army’s...
Iraq’s army wasn’t much of an army and probably not much of a real threat to its neighbors, let alone the United States.

relatively large size, all of the divisions other than the Republican Guard were reported to be at 50 percent combat effectiveness. Moreover, the army (including the elite Republican Guard) was outfitted with older Soviet and Chinese equipment—such as the T-55, T-62 and Type-59 main battle tanks—and half of all the army’s equipment was lacking spares. In other words, Iraq’s army wasn’t much of an army and probably not much of a real threat to its neighbors (especially if its wealthy Persian Gulf neighbors were willing to spend some of their oil money on their own defense), let alone the United States.

Similarly, the Iraqi air force did not amount to much. Its aircraft inventory consisted largely of older Soviet aircraft—such as the MiG-21 and MiG-23—and a few French Mirage F-1s. Moreover, the serviceability of those aircraft was only about 55 percent. Compounding the problem was Iraqi pilots’ lack of flying experience; senior pilots averaged 90–120 hours per year and junior pilots as little as 20 hours. In comparison, U.S. Air Force fighter pilots average 205 hours.

Military analyst Anthony Cordesman at the Center for Strategic and International Studies made the following assessments in a report published about a year before the Iraq war:

- “Iraq has lacked the funds, spare parts, and production capabilities to sustain the quality of its consolidated forces.
- “It has not been able to recapitalize any aspect of its force structure, and about two-thirds of its remaining inventory of armor and aircraft is obsolete by Western standards.
- “Equally important, the U.S. has made major upgrades in virtually every aspect of its fighter avionics, attack munitions, cruise missile capabilities, and intelligence, reconnaissance, and targeting capabilities.
- “Iraq’s inability to recapitalize and modernize its forces means that much of its large order of battle is now obsolete or obsolete, has uncertain combat readiness, and will be difficult to sustain in combat.”

And according to another analysis of Iraqi military capabilities by Cordesman:

- “About half of its land order of battle consists of relatively low-grade infantry units, and only one of its seven corps really seems combat ready enough to conduct major offensive or defensive operations. It’s land force equipment is at best mid-1980s technology and combat worn, and much of its is obsolescent. Even its much-touted T-72 tanks proved incapable of successfully engaging earlier models of the U.S. M-1 [main battle tank] during the Gulf War.
- “Iraq lacks all of the modern airborne platforms, sensors, and other equipment needed to carry out effective air battle management for either air defense or offense. Only about one-third of its force now consists of relatively modern high performance aircraft like the Su-20, Mirage F-1, Su-24, MiG-25, and MiG-29. Even these airframes are now 1970s–1980s models, with no major modernization of avionics, munitions, or electronic warfare equipment. While some individual pilots perform well, overall air battle training is outdated, unrealistic, and incompetent.”

The bottom line is that the Iraqi military posed no real threat to the United States. That the Iraqi military was no match for U.S. forces was borne out by the war itself. Although the war was not the “cakewalk” that some observers predicted, U.S. military forces effectively swept away Iraqi forces in the span of less than four weeks.

WMD or No WMD Is Not the Question

Of course, it was not Iraq’s military per se that the Bush administration portrayed as a threat to the United States but its alleged possession of WMD. Speaking in Nashville, Tennessee, in August 2002, Vice President
Dick Cheney said that “Saddam Hussein will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon” and that “there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction; there is no doubt that he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us.”\textsuperscript{31} In Cincinnati, Ohio, in October 2002, the president said:

Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction are controlled by a murderous tyrant, who has already used chemical weapons to kill thousands of people. This same tyrant has tried to dominate the Middle East, has invaded and brutally occupied a small neighbor, has struck other nations without warning, and holds an unrelenting hostility towards the United States. . . .

As a former chief weapons inspector for the U.N. has said, “The fundamental problem with Iraq remains the nature of the regime itself: Saddam Hussein is a homicidal dictator who is addicted to weapons of mass destruction.”

In 1995, after several years of deceit by the Iraqi regime, the head of Iraq’s military industries defected. It was then that the regime was forced to admit that it had produced more than 30,000 liters of anthrax and other deadly biological agents. The inspectors, however, concluded that Iraq had likely produced two to four times that amount. This is a massive stockpile of biological weapons that has never been accounted for, and is capable of killing millions.

We know that the regime has produced thousands of tons of chemical agents, including mustard gas, sarin nerve gas, and VX nerve gas. Saddam Hussein also has experience in using chemical weapons. He has ordered chemical attacks on Iran, and on more than forty villages in his own country. These actions killed or injured at least 20,000 people, more than six times the number of people who died in the attacks of September 11.

And surveillance photos reveal that the regime is rebuilding facilities that it has used to produce chemical and biological weapons.\textsuperscript{32}

And just three days before the war began, Cheney reiterated, “We know he’s [Saddam Hussein’s] absolutely devoted to trying to acquire nuclear weapons, and we believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons.”\textsuperscript{33}

**Chemical and Biological Weapons**

From December 1998 until November 2002, Iraq had refused to allow United Nations weapons inspectors into the country despite the requirements of Security Council Resolution 687. Many analysts understandably surmised that Iraq had used that time period to reconstitute its prohibited WMD programs. According to a 2002 Central Intelligence Agency report: “Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons effort, energized its missile program, and invested more heavily in biological weapons.”\textsuperscript{34} But an important part of the CIA’s assessment of Iraq’s chemical weapons program was that “Baghdad continues to rebuild and expand dual-use infrastructure that it could divert quickly to CW [chemical weapons] production.”\textsuperscript{35} The CIA cited the chlorine and phenol plants in Fallujah as examples of dual-use infrastructure but also noted that “both chemicals have legitimate civilian uses.”\textsuperscript{36} Iraq’s biological weapons program was considered similar to its chemical weapons program: “Iraq has the capability to convert quickly legitimate vaccine and biopesticide plants to biological warfare (BW) production.”\textsuperscript{37}

It is also important to note that CIA estimates of Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons used as the basis for the Bush administration’s decision to go to war against Iraq were not significantly different from the CIA’s pre-9/11 assessment that Iraq “has attempted to purchase numerous dual-use items for, or under the guise of, legitimate civilian use. This equipment—in principle subject to U.N. scrutiny—also could be
diverted for WMD purposes.\textsuperscript{38} So there was really nothing new about Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons capabilities or programs that constituted an imminent threat.

**Nuclear Weapons Program**

Despite ominous claims by administration officials (most notably Vice President Cheney) about a seemingly imminent nuclear threat from Iraq, the 2002 CIA report was more equivocal. According to the CIA:

- “Although Saddam probably does not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient material to make any, he remains intent on acquiring them. . . . How quickly Iraq will obtain its first nuclear weapons depends on when it acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material.”\textsuperscript{39}
- “More than ten years of sanctions and the loss of much of Iraq’s physical nuclear infrastructure under IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] oversight have not diminished Saddam’s interest in acquiring or developing nuclear weapons. . . . The acquisition of sufficient fissile material is Iraq’s principal hurdle in developing a nuclear weapon.”\textsuperscript{40}

The CIA concluded that “Iraq is unlikely to produce indigenously enough weapons-grade material for a deliverable nuclear weapon until the last half of this decade. Baghdad could produce a nuclear weapon within a year if it were able to procure weapons-grade fissile material abroad.”\textsuperscript{41} But even that possibility was not a foregone conclusion. The IISS agreed with the CIA’s assessment, but with an important caveat: “If Iraq were somehow able to acquire nuclear weapons–usable nuclear material from a foreign source, however, it could probably produce nuclear weapons in a relatively short time, assuming that Iraq’s nuclear weapons design team has completed their work.”\textsuperscript{42}

Again, the pre-9/11 CIA estimate of Iraq’s ability to develop a nuclear weapon was largely the same: “Iraq has probably continued low-level theoretical R&D associated with its nuclear program. A sufficient source of fissile material remains Iraq’s most significant obstacle to being able to produce a nuclear weapon.”\textsuperscript{43}

**Exaggerated WMD Threat**

It is clear now that the administration’s concerns about Iraq’s WMD were overstated. Before and during the Iraq war, administration officials implied that the United States was relatively certain where WMD were located.\textsuperscript{44} But after nearly six months of searching, David Kay, who is heading up the U.S.-led, 1,400-person inspection team in Iraq, testified before Congress that the United States has “not yet found stocks of weapons” and has discovered only “WMD-related program activities.”\textsuperscript{45} According to Kay, “It clearly does not look like a massive, resurgent program, based on what we discovered.”\textsuperscript{46} More pointedly, Kay admits that “information found to date suggests that Iraq’s large-scale capability to develop, produce, and fill new CW munitions was reduced—if not entirely destroyed—during Operations Desert Storm and Desert Fox, 13 years of U.N. sanctions, and U.N. inspections.”\textsuperscript{47}

**No Nuclear Program**

Iraq’s alleged nuclear weapons program has also been debunked. The claim by President Bush in his 2003 State of the Union address (and three other Bush administration statements that month) that Saddam Hussein was seeking “significant quantities of uranium from Africa”\textsuperscript{48} is now discredited.\textsuperscript{49} Similarly, the aluminum tubes purchased by Iraq, which the administration claimed were for building centrifuges for uranium enrichment,\textsuperscript{50} have turned out to be “not suited for centrifuges,” and “Iraq had no program to use them as such.”\textsuperscript{51} Australian Brig. Gen. Stephen Meekin, who commands the Joint Captured Enemy Material Exploitation Center that reports to Kay, claims, “The tubes were used for rockets.”\textsuperscript{52}

According to Kay, Iraq took “steps to preserve some technological capability from the
pre-1991 nuclear weapons program,” and its nuclear weapons program was in “the very most rudimentary” state. Postwar inspections have revealed that, although Saddam Hussein certainly had nuclear ambitions, Iraq did not have an active nuclear weapons program. According to Kay, “Despite evidence of Saddam’s continued ambition to acquire nuclear weapons, to date we have not uncovered evidence that Iraq undertook significant post-1998 steps to actually build nuclear weapons or produce fissile material.”

**Ballistic Missiles**

Even if Iraq possessed chemical or biological weapons (which was a fair assumption) or even a nuclear weapon (which was a stretch of the imagination), it did not have the long-range military capability to strike the United States and thus pose a direct threat. According to the IISS:

> Iraq’s current ballistic missile capabilities are very modest, compared to its robust missile force and substantial missile development and production infrastructure in 1991. The Gulf War and subsequent UN efforts cost Iraq its large missile force and destroyed most of its infrastructure for indigenous development and production of Scud-based missiles. . . .

> Since the end of inspections in 1998, it is unlikely that Iraq has been able to reconstitute its previous missile production capabilities for long range missiles, which would have required significant foreign assistance.

None of the Iraqi ballistic missiles cited by the CIA—al-Husayn variants of Soviet Scud B missiles with an extended range of 650 kilometers, the al-Abbas with a range of 900 kilometers, and the Badr-2000 with an estimated range of 750 to 1,000 kilometers—had the range to reach the United States. It is important to note that the last two missiles were considered in development, not operationally deployed. The CIA’s 2001 assessment of the ballistic missile threat had previously concluded that “although Iraq could attempt before 2015 to test a rudimentary long-range missile based on its failed Al-Abid SLV [space-launched vehicle], such a missile almost certainly would fail,” and that “Iraq is unlikely to test before 2015 any ICBMs that would threaten the United States, even if UN prohibitions were eliminated or significantly reduced in the next few years.”

**Iraq Could Be Deterred**

Furthermore, the evidence suggests that even if Saddam Hussein had WMD he could be deterred from using them against the United States. During the Gulf War, Iraq was believed to possess chemical and biological weapons but did not use those weapons against coalition forces, presumably because of the possibility of U.S. nuclear retaliation. In August 1990, then-defense secretary Cheney stated that “it should be clear to Saddam Hussein that we have a wide range of military capabilities that will let us respond with overwhelming force and extract a very high price should he be foolish enough to use chemical weapons on United States forces.” And the American government reportedly used third-party channels to privately warn Iraq that “in the event of a first use of a weapon of mass destruction by Iraq, the United States reserved the right to use any form of retaliation (presumably up to and including nuclear weapons).”

According to Keith Payne, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense in the current Bush administration:

> What, for example, was the value of nuclear weapons for deterrence in the Gulf War? By Iraqi accounts, nuclear deterrence prevented Iraq’s use of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) that could have inflicted horrendous civilian and military casualties on us and our allies. Senior Iraqi wartime leaders have explained that while U.S. conventional threats were insufficient to deter, implicit U.S. nuclear threats did deter Saddam

Even if Iraq possessed chemical or biological weapons or even a nuclear weapon, it did not have the long-range military capability to strike the United States.
Hussein’s use of chemical and biological weapons. As the then-head of Iraqi military intelligence, Gen. Waffic al Sammarai, has stated, Saddam Hussein did not use chemical or biological weapons during the war, “because the warning was quite severe, and quite effective. The allied troops were certain to use nuclear arms and the price will be too dear and too high.”

That Iraq could be deterred was reinforced by an October 7, 2002, letter from CIA director George Tenet to Sen. Bob Graham (D-FL), then chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence. According to Tenet:

Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW [chemical and biological weapons] against the United States.

Should Saddam conclude that a U.S.-led attack could no longer be deterred, he probably would become much less constrained in adopting terrorist actions. Such terrorism might involve conventional means, as with Iraq’s unsuccessful attempt at a terrorist offensive in 1991, or CBW.

Saddam might decide that the extreme step of assisting Islamist terrorists in conducting a WMD attack against the United States would be his last chance to exact vengeance by taking a large number of victims with him.

The October 7 letter also declassified the following dialogue at a closed hearing:

Senator Levin: . . . If [Saddam] didn’t feel threatened, did not feel threatened, is it likely that he would initiate an attack using a weapon of mass destruction?
Senior Intelligence Witness: . . . My judgment would be that the probability of him initiating an attack—let me put a time frame on it—in the foreseeable future, given the conditions we understand now, the likelihood I think would be low.

So even if WMD are eventually found in Iraq (which is less and less likely as time passes), their mere existence would not qualify as an imminent threat that absolutely required preemptive military action. If possession of WMD constitutes a threat requiring preemptive military action, then Iraq would not be the only country targeted by the United States. The list would not even be limited to the other members of the axis of evil—Iran and North Korea. According to the Department of Defense, the extant and emerging threats to the United States, friends, and allies include 12 nations with nuclear weapons programs, 13 nations with biological weapons, 16 nations with chemical weapons, and 28 nations with ballistic missiles.

**No Ties to Al Qaeda**

To make the threat of WMD seem even more dire, President Bush argued either explicitly or implicitly on several occasions that Saddam Hussein could (the implication being that he would) give WMD to terrorists:

- State of the Union address, January 29, 2002: “By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred.”
- At the United Nations on September 12, 2002: “With every step the Iraqi regime takes toward gaining and deploying the most terrible weapons, our own options to confront that regime will narrow. And if an emboldened regime were to supply these weapons to terrorist allies, then the attacks of September the 11th would be a prelude to far greater horrors.”
- In the Rose Garden on September 26, 2002: “The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons. The Iraqi regime is building the facilities necessary
to make more biological and chemical weapons. And according to the British government, the Iraqi regime could launch a biological or chemical attack in as little as 45 minutes after the orders were given.

“The regime has long-standing and continuing ties to terrorist organizations. And there are Al Qaeda terrorists inside Iraq.”

• In Cincinnati, Ohio, on October 7, 2002: “Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists. Alliances with terrorists could allow the Iraqi regime to attack America without leaving any fingerprints.”

“If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy, or steal an amount of highly-enriched uranium a little larger than a single softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year. And Saddam Hussein would be in a position to pass nuclear technology to terrorists.”

• In Sioux Falls, South Dakota, on November 3, 2002: “Saddam Hussein is a man who told the world he wouldn’t have weapons of mass destruction, but he’s got them. He’s a man who a while ago who was close to having a nuclear weapon. Imagine if this madman had a nuclear weapon. It’s a man who not only has chemical weapons, but he’s used chemical weapons against some of his neighbors. He used chemical weapons, incredibly enough, against his own people. He can’t stand America. He can’t stand some of our closest friends.

“And, not only that, he is—would like nothing better than to hook up with one of these shadowy terrorist networks like Al Qaeda, provide some weapons and training to them, let them come and do his dirty work, and we wouldn’t be able to see his fingerprints on his action.”

• In New Orleans, Louisiana, on December 3, 2002: “It’s important for our fellow Americans to understand that, when we’re talking about Saddam Hussein, we’re talking about a man who said he has had no weapons of mass destruction, yet we believe has weapons of mass destruction—a man who has not only had weapons of mass destruction, but he’s used weapons of mass destruction. He used weapons of mass destruction on his neighbors and he used weapons of mass destruction on his own citizens. He’s a man who has professed hate to America, as well as our friends and allies. He’s a man who has got terrorist ties, a man who helps train terrorists. He’s a threat and he’s a danger.”

• State of the Union address, January 28, 2003: “With nuclear arms or a full arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, Saddam Hussein could resume his ambitions of conquest in the Middle East and create deadly havoc in that region. And this Congress and the American people must recognize another threat. Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications, and statements by people now in custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of Al Qaeda. Secretly, and without fingerprints, he could provide one of his hidden weapons to terrorists, or help them develop their own.”

But those “doom and gloom” statements have to be contrasted with the fact that Saddam Hussein never gave chemical or biological weapons to anti-Israeli Palestinian terrorist groups that he supported. And after being briefed by David Kay in Iraq, CSIS military expert Anthony Cordesman has concluded that there is “no evidence of any Iraqi effort to transfer weapons of mass destruction or weapons to terrorists.”

The Specter of 9/11

To further heighten fears of Iraq’s alleged WMD, the president and other senior administration officials often created the impression, without explicitly making the charge,
that Iraq was involved with the September 11 terrorist attacks:

- “And we know that after September the 11th, Saddam Hussein’s regime gleefully celebrated the terrorist attacks on America.
  
  “Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists. Alliance with terrorists could allow the Iraqi regime to attack America without leaving any fingerprints.”

- “What’s important for us as we work to secure the homeland is to remember the stakes have changed. After September the 11th, the world changed. It changed for a lot of reasons. Perhaps the most profound reason on a foreign policy perspective, or from a homeland security perspective, is that we’re no longer protected by two big oceans. Used to be if there was a threat overseas we could deal with it if we chose to do so, but we didn’t have to worry about something happening here at home. It used to be oceans could protect us from conflict and from threats.
  
  “But that’s changed, and it’s important to have people in the Senate who are clear-eyed realists. It’s important to have people who see the world the way it is, not the way we hope it is. And the world is a dangerous place, particularly with people like Saddam Hussein in power.”

- “Before September the 11th, many in the world believed that Saddam Hussein could be contained. But chemical agents, lethal viruses and shadowy terrorist networks are not easily contained. Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons and other plans—this time armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known. We will do everything in our power to make sure that that day never comes.”

At a press conference just prior to invading Iraq, President Bush said:

- “If the world fails to confront the threat posed by the Iraqi regime, refusing to use force, even as a last resort, free nations would assume immense and unacceptable risks. The attacks of September the 11th, 2001 showed what the enemies of America did with four airplanes. We will not wait to see what terrorists or terrorist states could do with weapons of mass destruction.

- “My job is to protect the American people. It used to be that we could think that you could contain a person like Saddam Hussein, that oceans would protect us from his type of terror. September the 11th should say to the American people that we’re now a battlefield, that weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terrorist organization could be deployed here at home.

- “I hope they understand the lesson of September the 11th. The lesson is, is that we’re vulnerable to attack, wherever it may occur, and we must take threats which gather overseas very seriously. We don’t have to deal with them all militarily. But we must deal with them. And in the case of Iraq, it is now time for him to disarm.”

The president continued to imply a connection between 9/11 and Iraq after the war:

- “The battle of Iraq is one victory in a war on terror that began on September the 11, 2001.”

- “Since America put out the fires of September the 11th, and mourned our dead, and went to war, history has taken a different turn. We have carried the fight to the enemy. We are rolling back the terrorist threat to civilization, not on the fringes of its influence, but at the heart of its power.

  “This work continues. In Iraq, we are helping the long suffering people of that country to build a decent and democrat-

President Bush has been forced to concede that “there is no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with September the 11th.”
ic society at the center of the Middle East. Together we are transforming a place of torture chambers and mass graves into a nation of laws and free institutions. This undertaking is difficult and costly—yet worthy of our country, and critical to our security.

“And for America, there will be no going back to the era before September the 11th, 2001—to false comfort in a dangerous world. We have learned that terrorist attacks are not caused by the use of strength; they are invited by the perception of weakness. And the surest way to avoid attacks on our own people is to engage the enemy where he lives and plans. We are fighting that enemy in Iraq.”

On Good Morning America on September 8, 2003, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice responded to a question about Iraq being the central front on the war on terrorism by saying: “The president told the American people shortly after September 11th that we were going to fight this war on the offense. We were going to fight it on the territory of the terrorists.” Clearly, the implication was that Iraq was the territory of the terrorists responsible for 9/11. Vice President Cheney was even more explicit on Meet the Press less than a week later:

If we’re successful in Iraq, if we can stand up a good representative government in Iraq, that secures the region so that it never again becomes a threat to its neighbors or to the United States, so it’s not pursuing weapons of mass destruction, so that it’s not a safe haven for terrorists, now we will have struck a major blow right at the heart of the base, if you will, the geographic base of the terrorists who have had us under assault now for many years, but most especially on 9/11.

It should come as no surprise, then, that according to an August 2003 Washington Post poll, 69 percent of Americans believed that it was likely that Saddam Hussein was involved in the September 11 terrorist attacks. But two years after 9/11, President Bush has been forced to concede that “there is no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with September the 11th.”

Mohammed Atta

If the evidence linking Hussein to 9/11 amounts to nothing, then the evidence of any active cooperation between Hussein and Al Qaeda is next to nothing. The first claim of a possible linkage between the former Iraqi regime and Al Qaeda was that Mohammed Atta (one of the September 11 suicide hijackers) met with an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in April 2001. But shortly after that claim was first made, U.S. officials stated that the meetings did not constitute hard proof that Iraq was involved in the September 11 attacks, NATO’s secretary-general Lord Robertson told U.S. senators that there was “not a scintilla” of evidence linking Iraq with the September 11 attacks, and Israel’s chief of military intelligence stated, “I don’t see a direct link between Iraq and the hijackings and terror attacks in the United States.” Even the Czech government has distanced itself from its original stance:

But that same month [December 2001], Czech President Vaclav Havel was retreating from the more definitive accounts provided by his government, saying there was “a 70 percent” chance the meeting took place. Indeed, while Czech officials never officially backed away from their initial stance, officials at various agencies say that, privately, the Czechs have discredited the accuracy of the untested informant who came to them with the information. According to one report, Havel quietly informed the White House in 2002 there was no evidence to confirm the meeting.

The Czechs had reviewed records using Atta’s name and his seven known
aliases provided by the CIA and found nothing to confirm the April 2001 trip.  

And according to FBI director Robert Mueller, “We ran down literally hundreds of thousands of leads and checked every record we could get our hands on, from flight reservations to car rentals to bank accounts,” but neither the FBI nor the CIA could find any evidence that Atta left or returned to the United States (either using his own name or known aliases) at the time of the alleged meeting.

**Ansar al-Islam**

The second alleged link between Saddam Hussein’s regime and Al Qaeda is based on the presence of the Ansar al-Islam terrorist group in northern Iraq. This was the case made by Secretary of State Colin Powell at the United Nations Security Council in February 2003:

> But what I want to bring to your attention today is the potentially much more sinister nexus between Iraq and the Al Qaeda terrorist network, a nexus that combines classic terrorist organizations and modern methods of murder. Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu Mud‘ab al-Zarqawi, an associate and collaborator of Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda lieutenants.

Zarqawi, a Palestinian born in Jordan, fought in the Afghan war more than a decade ago. Returning to Afghanistan in 2000, he oversaw a terrorist training camp. One of his specialties and one of the specialties of this camp is poisons. When our coalition ousted the Taliban, the Zarqawi network helped establish another poison and explosive training center camp. And this camp is located in northeastern Iraq. . . .

Those helping to run this camp are Zarqawi lieutenants operating in northern Kurdish areas outside Saddam Hussein’s controlled Iraq. But Baghdad has an agent in the most senior levels of the radical organization, Ansar al-Islam, that controls this corner of Iraq. In 2000 this agent offered Al Qaeda safe haven in the region. After we swept Al Qaeda from Afghanistan, some of its members accepted this safe haven. They remain their [sic] today.

Zarqawi’s activities are not confined to this small corner of northeast Iraq. He traveled to Baghdad in May 2002 for medical treatment, staying in the capital of Iraq for two months while he recuperated to fight another day.

During this stay, nearly two dozen extremists converged on Baghdad and established a base of operations there. These Al Qaeda affiliates, based in Baghdad, now coordinate the movement of people, money and supplies into and throughout Iraq for his network, and they’ve now been operating freely in the capital for more than eight months.

But as Secretary Powell himself acknowledged, Zarqawi and Ansar al-Islam were based “in northern Kurdish areas outside Saddam Hussein’s controlled Iraq,” which is hardly a strong case for close ties between Hussein and Al Qaeda (and raises the question of why the U.S. military did not take action earlier against an alleged Al Qaeda target inside the coalition-controlled no-fly zone). Moreover, the State Department describes Ansar al-Islam as “a radical Islamist group of Iraqi Kurds and Arabs who have vowed to establish an independent Islamic state in northern Iraq.”

That is a clear divergence, not a convergence, of the ideology and goals of Ansar al-Islam and the former regime in Baghdad—again, not convincing evidence that Hussein and Al Qaeda were in league with each other.

**No Affinity between Hussein and Al Qaeda**

In fact, the evidence suggests the opposite. Rohan Gunaratna, director of terrorism research at Singapore’s Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies and author of *Inside Al
Qaeda, is considered one of the world’s foremost experts on Al Qaeda and was afforded the opportunity to examine several thousand Al Qaeda documents and videos after Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Gunaratna “could not find any evidence of Al Qaeda links to Saddam Hussein or the Baghdad administration,” and the videos he watched “speak of [Saddam] as a real monster and not a real Muslim.”92

Even more telling is the fact that in the war’s aftermath the administration has not unearthed any new and compelling evidence to support its claim that Saddam Hussein had ties to Al Qaeda. One would think that, with all of Hussein’s documents in the hands of U.S. military and intelligence and so many high-ranking members of the regime in custody, such evidence would have surfaced more than six months after the fall of the regime. Instead, the president and other senior administration officials simply keep repeating the mantra that Saddam and Al Qaeda were linked without providing any real proof.

Despite President Bush’s assertion that “there’s no question that Saddam Hussein had Al Qaeda ties,”93 the reality is that, at most, both share a common hatred of the United States. That is hardly enough to make them allies or to warrant the conclusion that Hussein would give WMD to Al Qaeda. It is important to remember that Hussein was a Muslim secular ruler while bin Laden is a radical Muslim fundamentalist—their ideological views are hardly compatible. Indeed, Saddam Hussein’s regime was exactly the kind of government that bin Laden claims is illegitimate and would be a target for Al Qaeda. To the extent that bin Laden expressed any sympathy for Iraq, it was for the Iraqi people, not the regime in Baghdad. For example, an audiotape attributed to bin Laden released a month before the Iraq war describes Iraq as a “former capital of Islam” and says that Muslim resistance to American aggression “should not be for championing ethnic groups, or for championing the non-Islamic regimes in all Arab countries, including Iraq.”94 Intelligence analysts inside and outside the government have pointed out that bin Laden (if the voice on the tape was indeed bin Laden’s) went out of his way in the recording to show his disdain for Hussein and the Baath Party by referring to them as “infidels” and an “infidel regime” that should be aided only for the “sake of Allah.”95

Iraq’s Ties to Terrorism Not a Threat to the United States

That does not mean that the former Iraqi regime did not have links to terrorism. According to the State Department’s 2002 “Patterns of Global Terrorism” report:

Baghdad overtly assisted two categories of Iraqi-based terrorist organizations—Iranian dissidents devoted to toppling the Iranian Government and a variety of Palestinian groups opposed to peace with Israel. The groups include the Iranian Mujahedin-e Khalq, the Abu Nidal organization (although Iraq reportedly killed its leader), the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), and the Arab Liberation Front (ALF). In the past year, the PLF increased its operational activities against Israel and sent its members to Iraq for training for future terrorist attacks.

Baghdad provided material assistance to other Palestinian terrorist groups that are in the forefront of the intifadah. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, HAMAS, and the Palestine Islamic Jihad are the three most important groups to whom Baghdad has extended outreach and support efforts.

Saddam paid the families of Palestinian suicide bombers to encourage Palestinian terrorism, channeling $25,000 since March through the ALF alone to families of suicide bombers in Gaza and the West Bank. Public testimonials by Palestinian civilians and officials and cancelled checks captured by Israel in the West Bank verify the
but the few terrorist groups that previously received some support from Iraq were not direct threats to the United States, and those that had previously attacked U.S. targets had not done so for almost 20 years.97

The important point to stress here is that the terrorist threat to the United States is the Al Qaeda terrorist network, not other terrorist groups who attack other countries. Because terrorism is an unjustifiable and heinous act that kills innocent people, it is all too easy to lump all terrorist groups (especially those that are Muslim affiliated) with Al Qaeda, but that would be a grave error. The State Department lists 36 designated foreign terrorist organizations and 38 other terrorist groups.98 But other than Al Qaeda, few, if any, attack U.S. targets. The terrorist groups that target other countries (e.g., Israel, Britain, Spain, India) are not direct threats to America, and the United States cannot realistically target everyone else’s terrorist enemies—more than 70 groups. Even worse, if the United States did make other countries’ terrorist enemies our enemies, those terrorist groups that do not currently attack the United States would have incentive to make America their target.

Conclusion

In the final analysis, the war against Iraq was the wrong war. Not because the United States used preemptive military force—preemptive self-defense would have been justified in the face of a truly imminent threat. Not because the United States acted without the consent of the United Nations—no country should surrender its defense to a vote of other nations. And not because Iraq had WMD—so far none has been discovered, and, even if those weapons existed, they were not a threat.

The war against Iraq was the wrong war because the enemy at the gates was, and continues to be, the Al Qaeda terrorist network operating in 60 countries around the world. Although it seems obvious, it is worth reminding ourselves that the attacks of September 11 were carried out by Al Qaeda under Osama bin Laden’s leadership, not by Iraq led by Saddam Hussein. None of the 19 hijackers was Iraqi. Iraq has not been proved to be linked to the planning, financing, or execution of those attacks. And the former regime was not known to support or provide safe harbor to Al Qaeda, as did the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

Therefore, President Bush’s three postwar statements don’t ring true.

“Our nation is more secure.”

This presumes that Iraq was a correct target, as was the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, in the war to dismantle the Al Qaeda terrorist network. But Iraq was more a case of “back to the future” than of making real progress against Al Qaeda. In the rush to war against Iraq, one thing has seemingly been forgotten: prior to September 11, much of the national security focus of the Bush administration was on missile defense against WMD and the so-called rogue states, including Iraq. The paradigm used by the administration then (and now) was that of state-sponsored terrorism, which has traditionally been defined as nations using “terrorism as a means of political expression.”99 But this is exactly the wrong approach because Al Qaeda’s terrorism is not state sponsored; it is private terrorism,100 independent of any one nation-state. To be sure, Al Qaeda will take advantage of a willing host as it did in Afghanistan. However, Al Qaeda’s ideology and agenda are internally driven, not a political extension of a government. And Al Qaeda’s capabilities are largely self-financed and self-acquired, not bestowed by a nation-state benefactor such as Iraq. So removing an unfriendly regime and an admittedly brutal dictatorship in Iraq—however beneficial that might be for the people of Iraq and however noble the intention of bringing democracy to that country and region—did not diminish, and may have increased, the Al Qaeda terrorist threat, which is the real threat to U.S. security.
“Iraq is now the central front [in the war on terrorism].”

If Iraq has become the central front in the war on terrorism, it is only because of the U.S. decision to invade that country. Iraq was not a hotbed for Al Qaeda under Saddam Hussein’s brutal rule, but Al Qaeda has skillfully used the Iraq war to rally more people to its cause. In February 2003 an audiotape believed to be the voice of Osama bin Laden called for Muslim resistance against an American attack on Iraq:

• “We stress the importance of the martyrdom operations against the enemy—operations that inflicted harm on the United States and Israel that have been unprecedented in their history, thanks to Almighty God.
• “We also point out that whoever supported the United States, including the hypocrites of Iraq or the rulers of Arab countries, those who approved their actions and followed them in this crusade war by fighting with them or providing bases and administrative support, or any form of support, even by words, to kill the Muslims in Iraq, should know that they are apostates and outside the community of Muslims.
• “We also stress to honest Muslims that they should move, incite, and mobilize the [Islamic] nation, amid such grave events and hot atmosphere so as to liberate themselves from those unjust and renegade ruling regimes, which are enslaved by the United States.
• “Regardless of the removal or the survival of the socialist party or Saddam, Muslims in general and the Iraqis in particular must brace themselves for jihad against this unjust campaign and acquire ammunition and weapons.”

A May 2003 audiotape believed to be the voice of bin Laden’s top lieutenant, Ayman al Zawahiri, condemns Arab countries that supported the U.S.-led war against Iraq and urges Muslims to carry out more suicide attacks. A videotape aired on the second anniversary of 9/11 showed bin Laden and al Zawahiri and included audio of al Zawahiri calling on Iraqi guerrillas to “bury” U.S. troops. And an October 2003 audiotape broadcast on Al Jazeera and attributed to bin Laden calls on young Muslims to take up holy war against the United States: “O young people of Islam everywhere, especially in the neighboring countries [of Iraq] and in Yemen, you should pursue jihad and roll your sleeves up.”

The irony is that the Iraq war has made the anti-U.S. terrorist problem worse. Although the administration claims that the war on terrorism is not a crusade against Islam, Gen. William Boykin’s remarks to the contrary, the U.S. occupation makes the radical Islamists’ case that the West is invading Islam, which only encourages the Muslim world (regardless of its sympathies for bin Laden and Al Qaeda) to unite against the United States. The U.S. military presence in Iraq serves as a target (much as it was in Lebanon in the 1980s) and is a magnet and recruiting poster for Islamic jihadists (Al Qaeda or otherwise). And the decision to go to war against Iraq could ultimately make prosecuting the war against Al Qaeda more difficult, because the administration’s focus on Iraq comes at the expense of focusing attention and resources on Al Qaeda and the ill will of many friends and allies generated by the war could adversely affect future cooperation needed to dismantle Al Qaeda cells around the world.

“We are aggressively striking the terrorists in Iraq, defeating them there so we will not have to face them in our own country.”

To be sure, Al Qaeda may be taking advantage of the U.S. situation in Iraq and could be behind some of the terrorist attacks there—for example, the bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003, the bombing of the Red Cross in Baghdad in October 2003, and the bombing of the Italian paramilitary base in Nasiriyah in November 2003. But the opposition to the
U.S. occupation of Iraq does not come primarily from Al Qaeda. First and foremost, the Sunni Baathists, who formerly held the reins of power under Saddam Hussein, are resisting the change brought by U.S. military action. Over time, their attacks have grown more frequent, more sophisticated, and more lethal, but they are not terrorists who would otherwise attack the United States. Second, and seemingly overlooked, is the fact that a growing number of Iraqis are resentful of foreign military occupation and control of their country. Again, these are not people who would otherwise flock to Al Qaeda’s cause and kill innocent Americans. And those Al Qaeda operatives who may be in Iraq (ironically, there are probably more Al Qaeda in Iraq now than when Saddam Hussein was in power) are more than likely there simply because the U.S. military presence is a convenient target in their own neighborhood. It is far easier for Al Qaeda to filter over the relatively porous and largely unguarded Iraqi borders (essentially equivalent in length to the U.S.-Mexican border that hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants sneak across every year) than to fly thousands of miles to the United States.

President Bush’s statement also assumes that, because the U.S. military is engaged in Iraq and Al Qaeda may be behind some of the terrorist attacks in Iraq, Al Qaeda is precluded from attacking elsewhere. The evidence suggests otherwise. Car bombings in Riyadh on May 12, 2003, and November 9, 2003, in Casablanca on May 16, 2003, and in Istanbul on November 15, 2003, have all been attributed to Al Qaeda. To be sure, Al Qaeda may not currently have the resources and capabilities to mount an attack against the United States (especially a massive attack on the scale of 9/11). However, if that is the case, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, not U.S. military operations in Iraq, is responsible for degrading Al Qaeda. According to the IISS:

U.S.-led military action in Afghanistan in response to the 11 September 2001 attacks and the continued allied military presence there released the Taliban’s stranglehold on the country and deprived bin Laden, his inner circle, and hundreds of rank-and-file Al Qaeda members of a friendly host, a recruiting “magnet,” and a comfortable physical base for training and operations.

Iraq is not Afghanistan where Al Qaeda was given safe haven and known to operate. Thus, U.S. military action in Iraq has had little or no direct effect on the ranks of Al Qaeda or its infrastructure. According to the IISS:

The counter-terrorism effort has also perversely impelled an already highly decentralized and evasive transnational terrorist network to become more “virtual” and protean and, therefore, harder to identify and neutralize . . . Al Qaeda’s greatest advantage is the logistical and operational flexibility afforded by having no state to defend, allowing it to maintain a flat, transnational, and clandestine organizational scheme with minimal dedicated “bricks-and-mortar” infrastructure . . .

The only physical infrastructure Al Qaeda now requires is safe houses to assemble bombs and to store weapons caches. Otherwise, notebook computers, encryption software, the Internet, multiple passports, and the ease of global transportation enable Al Qaeda to function as a largely invisible entity.

Therefore, continuing U.S. military operations in Iraq should not be cause to dismiss the warning issued by a group linked to Al Qaeda, the Abu-Hafs al-Masri Brigades, in the wake of the November 2003 car bombings in Turkey: “We tell the criminal Bush and his Arab and Western tails—especially Britain, Italy, Australia, and Japan—the cars of death will not stop at Baghdad, Riyadh, Istanbul, Nasiriyah, Jakarta, etc., until you see
them with your own eyes in the middle of the capital of this era’s tyrant, America.”

Even worse, the continued U.S. military occupation and insistence on creating a democracy in the image of this country may do more to create anti-American sentiment in Iraq, which breeds hatred that becomes a steppingstone to violence, including terrorism. A Gallup poll conducted in August and September 2003 that shows growing Iraqi skepticism about the United States’ motives and intentions is indicative of this possibility:

- “More than half of Baghdad’s residents . . . did not believe the United States would allow the Iraqi people to fashion their political future without the direct influence of Washington.
- “Only 5 percent of those polled . . . believed the United States invaded Iraq ‘to assist the Iraqi people,’ and only 1 percent believed it was to establish democracy there.
- “Forty-three percent of the respondents said they believed that U.S. and British forces invaded in March primarily ‘to rob Iraq’s oil.’”
- Eleven percent “believed the motive was to ‘change the Middle East map as the U.S. and Israel want.’”

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the poll is that “those who believed such attacks [against U.S. troops] were somewhat or completely justified—11 percent and 8 percent, respectively—would translate to 440,000 adults 18 or older among Baghdad’s adult population of 2.3 million.” Those Iraqis form the basis of a recruiting pool for Al Qaeda.

And stepped-up U.S. military action in Iraq against Iraqi insurgents, not Al Qaeda, may also do more to create potential anti-American terrorists. For example, in the so-called Sunni Triangle, which is viewed as the hotbed of the Iraqi resistance and where most of the coalition deaths have occurred, the United States increased the intensity of its operations in mid-November 2003. According to one U.S. officer, “Part of warfare is coercion and affecting the hearts and minds of the enemy and certainly a show of force is a tool that can be used by a commander.” One such “show of force” was U.S. F-16 fighter jets dropping several 500-pound bombs in Fallujah, which may have had more of an effect on Iraqis previously sympathetic to the United States than on the enemy. According to one resident in the area where the bombs exploded: “We used to have hopes of the Americans after they removed Saddam. We had liked them until this weekend. Why did they drop bombs near us and hurt and terrify my children like this?”

In other words, the United States may experience a cycle very similar to the one the Israelis experience in the West Bank, where military action, however well justified, creates spillover effects that result in more new terrorists. For example, the suicide bomber responsible for killing 19 Israelis in Haifa at the beginning of October 2003 was a 27-year-old apprentice lawyer, Hanadi Jaradat. Ms. Jaradat’s parents said they “had no indication that their daughter had any contacts with Islamic militants—no sense, they said, that she had any ambition but to establish her career as a lawyer, marry, and have children.” But she had motivation: an Israeli crackdown that resulted in the shooting death of her brother, Fadi, 23, and her cousin Saleh, 31. Aggressive U.S. military tactics may, in fact, be necessary to deal with Iraqi insurgents and terrorists. But such tactics may create more terrorists. If the Israeli experience is any indication, such a cycle will only play into the hands of Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda.

Finally, we know that the presence of 5,000 U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia after the Gulf War was a basis for Osama bin Laden’s hatred of the United States and one of his stated reasons for engaging in terrorism, including the devastating attacks of September 11 that killed more than 3,000 innocent people. Even Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, thought by many to be the architect of the administration’s Iraq policy, admits that U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia were “a huge recruiting
device for Al Qaeda. In fact if you look at bin Laden, one of his principal grievances was the presence of so-called crusader forces on the holy land, Mecca and Medina.”

Although virtually all U.S. troops have now been removed from Saudi Arabia, President Bush has talked about making a commitment to democracy in the Middle East (presumably starting with Iraq) that “must be a focus of American policy for decades to come.” And despite Pentagon plans to reduce U.S. troop levels in Iraq in 2004, the projected force will still be 105,000 troops. The troop drawdown, however, “does not mean we would physically leave the country any sooner,” according to Secretary Rumsfeld. President Bush asserts, “We will stay there [in Iraq] until the job is done and then we will leave,” but the question of when “the job is done” remains unanswered. One can only imagine how such a large U.S. military presence in the heart of the Middle East over a protracted period might fuel Al Qaeda’s rhetoric, recruiting, and future actions.

Ironically, President Bush provided his own indictment of the Iraq war when he addressed the UN General Assembly in September 2003: “No government should ignore the threat of terror, because to look the other way gives terrorists the chance to regroup and recruit and prepare.” But that is exactly what the Iraq war has done. And to make matters even worse, the American taxpayer is stuck with the bill for the war and postwar reconstruction—currently $150 billion and likely to grow. When you add it all up, it’s hard to imagine how the Iraq war could have been more wrong.

Notes


4. “THE PRESIDENT: David Kay’s report said that Saddam Hussein was in material breach of 1441, which would have been casus bellus. But one of the things that he first found was that there is clear violation of the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441. Material breach, they call it in the diplomatic circles. Casus bellus, it means that would have been a cause for a war.” White House, “President Holds Press Conference,” news release, October 28, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/20031028-2.html.

5. Resolution 1441 states that “Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions” and that the resolution was “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council.” Furthermore, “failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations,” and Iraq is warned that “it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations.” Military action is never explicitly directed. At best it is implied by the term “serious consequences” and the statement that “resolution 678 (1990) authorized Member States to use all necessary means to uphold and implement its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990 and all relevant resolutions subsequent to resolution 660 (1990) and to restore international peace and security in the area.” United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441, November 8, 2002, http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/682/26/PDF/N0268226.pdf?OpenElement. To be sure, those statements could be interpreted to authorize the use of force (and may even be generally accepted to mean such), but they are not an explicit authorization.


7. “Wolfowitz seized the opportunity. Attacking Afghanistan would be uncertain. He worried about 100,000 American troops bogged down in mountain fighting in Afghanistan six months
from then. In contrast, Iraq was a brittle oppressive regime that might break easily. It was doable.” Woodward, p. 83.

8. Ibid., p. 99.


13. “Q: I’m just asking if you’ve expanded your definition to countries who don’t just harbor terrorists, but also develop such weapons. THE PRESIDENT: Have I expanded the definition? I’ve always had that definition, as far as I’m concerned.” Ibid.

14. Ibid.


16. Ibid.


22. That Al Qaeda was no longer central to the war on terrorism was further evidenced by the fact that the Basque separatist movement E.T.A. was added to the list of organizations that the Bush administration is taking financial action against as part of the war on terrorism. Treasury Secretary Paul H. O’Neill characterized the E.T.A. as a terrorist organization of global reach and said: “Our crackdown on terrorists is blind to nationality and origin. It’s a net being cast on all terrorist parasites that threaten our allies and our national security.” Quoted in Joseph Kahn, “Expanding Financial Assault on Terror, U.S. Penalizes Basque Group,” New York Times online, February 27, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/02/international/europe/27ASSE.html. Also, the U.S. war on drugs was combined with the war on terrorism in Colombia. Karen DeYoung, “U.S. May End Curbs on Aid to Colombia,” Washington Post online, March 15, 2002, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A29575-2002Mar14.html.


25. Ibid., p. 106.

26. Ibid., p. 22.


29. “I believe demolishing Hussein’s military power and liberating Iraq would be a cakewalk. Let me give simple, responsible reasons: (1) It was a cakewalk last time; (2) they’ve become much weaker; (3) we’ve become much stronger; and (4) now we’re playing for keeps.” Ken Adelman, “Cakewalk in Iraq,” Washington Post, February 13, 2002, p. A27. Of course, characterizing the war against Iraq as a “cakewalk” begs the question of how Iraq could be such an imminent threat.


35. Ibid., p. 10.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., p. 13.

40. Ibid., pp. 5, 6.
41. Ibid., p. 6.


44. In his presentation to the United Nations on February 5, 2003, making the case for military action against Iraq, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated: “We also have satellite photos that indicate that banned materials have recently been moved from a number of weapons of mass destruction facilities. . . . This one is about a weapons munitions facility, a facility that holds ammunition at a place called Taji. This is one of about 65 such facilities in Iraq. We know that this one has housed chemical munitions.” Colin L. Powell, “Remarks to the United Nations Security Council,” February 5, 2003, www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/17300.htm. During the war, on March 30, 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said: “We know where they [WMD] are. They’re in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad and east, west, south and north somewhat.” He has since backtracked: “I should have said, ‘I believe they’re in that area; our intelligence tells us they’re in that area.’” Quoted in Vernon Loeb, “Rumsfeld Backs U.N. Resolution on Iraq,” Washington Post, September 11, 2003, p. A17.


50. Before the war, there was open disagreement within the U.S. intelligence community over whether the aluminum tubes were for centrifuges or artillery rockets. State Department and Department of Energy analysts thought the tubes were too long and too thick for centrifuges. The CIA and Pentagon analysts thought the tubes could be cut down and reamed out. See Pincus, “Bush Faced Dwindling Data on Iraq Nuclear Bid.” And the International Atomic Energy Agency concluded in January 2003 that the tubes were likely for artillery rockets and not suitable for uranium enrichment without significant modification. See Joby Warrick, “Doubts Remain about Purpose of Specialized Aluminum Tubes,”

52. Quoted in ibid.

53. Quoted in ibid.

54. Quoted in Priest and Pincus.

55. Quoted in Milbank and Pincus.


59. Ibid. Emphasis in original.


64. Ibid.


69. White House, “President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat.”


74. White House, “President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat.”

75. White House, “Iraq Must Disarm Says President in South Dakota Speech.”


78. White House, “President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended.”

79. White House, “President Addresses the Nation.”


81. “Vice President Dick Cheney Discusses the War with Iraq, the Economy, and Other Topics,” NBC Meet the Press, transcript, September 14, 2003.


85. Quoted in Robert Novak, “No Iraqi Connec-


88. Quoted in ibid.

89. Ibid.


93. Quoted in ibid.


97. According to the State Department, the Abu Nidal organization “has not staged a major attack against Western targets since the late 1980s.” The Abu Abbas faction of the Palestine Liberation Front “was responsible for the attack in 1985 on the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro* and the murder of US citizen Leon Klinghoffer.” Ibid., pp. 101, 117.

98. Ibid., pp. 99, 125.


100. This is how Peter Bergen, author of *Holy War, Inc.* and one of the few Western journalists to interview Osama bin Laden, described Al Qaeda in an interview, “Terrorism’s CEO,” *The Atlantic online*, January 9, 2002, http://www.theatlantic.com/unbound/interviews/int2002-01-09.htm.


105. Lt. Gen. William Boykin is the deputy under-secretary of defense for intelligence and war-fighting support. He is an evangelical Christian who has made several controversial statements about Islam while wearing his military uniform at private gatherings. Some of his remarks include: “I knew that my God was a real God, and his [a Muslim fighter in Somalia] was an idol” and “The enemy [Islamic extremists] is a spiritual enemy. He’s called the principality of darkness. The enemy is a guy called Satan.” Quoted in Reuters, “Rumsfeld Praises Army General Who Ridicules Islam as ‘Satan,’” *New York Times*, October 17, 2003, p. A7.


107. According to Army Gen. John Abizaid, head of the U.S. Central Command and the top military commander in Iraq, the “clear and most dangerous enemy to us at the present time are the former regime loyalists.” Quoted in Mike Allen, “Al Qaeda at Work in Iraq, Bush Tells BBC,” *Washington Post*, November 6, 2003, p. A22.


112. Ibid.

113. It is telling that the mid-November 2003 military operation was dubbed Operation Iron Hammer, which carries a much harsher and darker tone than the original Operation Iraqi Freedom.


117. According to Al Qaeda expert Rohan Gunaratna: “What Osama and his followers object to is not so much the American way of life, not so much Americans themselves, as what they perceive the American government, in the shape of its foreign policy, is doing to Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia, the occupation of which is intolerable to Osama.” Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 45. This is reinforced by Peter Bergen, one of the few Western journalists to interview bin Laden: “What he condemns the United States for is simple: its policies in the Middle East. Those are, to recap briefly: the continued U.S. military presence in Arabia; U.S. support for Israel; its continued bombing of Iraq; and its support for regimes such as Egypt and Saud Arabia that bin Laden regards as apostates from Islam.” Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc. (New York: Free Press, 2001), p. 223.


123. Quoted in ibid.


127. The White House is assuming no future spending on Iraq and Afghanistan. However a Congressional Budget Office report assumes that even a gradual reduction in troop strength in Iraq will result in $160 billion in spending over the next 10 years. The CBO also assumes that there will be an additional $20 billion request for rebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan. Jonathan Weisman, “Bush Proposals Will Keep Budget in Red, CBO Projects,” Washington Post, November 8, 2003, p. A11.