The 2000 presidential election was widely understood to be a battle for the courts. When George W. Bush finally won, following the Supreme Court’s split decision in Bush v. Gore, many Democratic activists simply dug in their heels, vowing to frustrate Bush’s efforts to fill vacancies on the federal courts. After Democrats took control of the Senate in May of 2001, they began calling explicitly for ideological litmus tests for judicial nominees. And they started a confirmation stall, especially for circuit court nominees, that continues to this day. Thus, 8 of Bush’s first 11 circuit court nominees went for over a year without even a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, and most have still not come before the committee.

As the backlog of nominees grows, Democrats are quite explicit about the politics of the matter: their aim is to keep “highly credentialed, conservative ideologues” from the bench. The rationales they offer contend that judges today are, and perhaps should be, “setting national policy.” One such “policy” they abhor is “the Supreme Court’s recent 5-4 decisions that constrain congressional power.” Thus the importance, they say, of placing “sympathetic judges” on the bench, judges who share “the core values held by most of our country’s citizens.” In a word, everything is politics, nothing is law.

The battle between politics and law takes place at many points in the American system of government, but in recent years it has become especially intense over judicial nominations. That is because judges today set national policy far more than they used to—and far more than the Constitution contemplates. Because the original constitutional design has been corrupted, especially as it relates to the constraints the Constitution places on politics, we have come to ideological litmus tests for judges. The New Deal Court, following President Roosevelt’s notorious Court-packing threat, politicized the Constitution, laying the foundation for several forms of judicial activism. After that it was only a matter of time until the judiciary itself had to be politicized. We are reaping the fruit of that constitutional corruption.

That will not change until we come to grips with the first principles of the matter—with the true foundations of our constitutional system. Yet neither party today seems willing to do that. Democrats have an activist agenda that a politicized Constitution well serves. Republicans have their own agenda and their own reasons for avoiding the basic issues. Thus, it may fall to the nominees themselves to take a stand for law over politics, the better to restore the Constitution and the rule of law it was meant to secure.
Introduction

The battle between politics and law takes place at many points in the American system of government, but in recent years it has been especially intense when presidents make nominations to the Supreme Court. With the bitterly contested election of George W. Bush to the presidency, however, the battle has moved even to lower court appointments. And it became more heated still when Democrats, after taking control of the Senate in May of 2001, began calling explicitly for ideological litmus tests for nominees for the federal courts. The particulars of such a test have not been made clear, apart from a few examples of views nominees must hold if they are to be confirmed. But the very call for such a test raises profoundly troubling questions going to the core of our system of government. Indeed, in the end it is nothing less than the rule of law that is at stake as nominees are increasingly being asked not whether they will apply the law, nor even what the law is, but whether their views are consistent with the purported views of the American people.

To illustrate and develop those points and to show, in particular, how constitutional corruption has led to ideological litmus tests for judicial nominees, this essay first surveys the recent political landscape as it pertains to judicial appointments, focusing on the aftermath of the 2000 elections, the Senate confirmation stall now going on, and the rationales Democrats have offered for the stall. The particulars of such a test have not been made clear, apart from a few examples of views nominees must hold if they are to be confirmed. But the very call for such a test raises profoundly troubling questions going to the core of our system of government. Indeed, in the end it is nothing less than the rule of law that is at stake as nominees are increasingly being asked not whether they will apply the law, nor even what the law is, but whether their views are consistent with the purported views of the American people.

To illustrate and develop those points and to show, in particular, how constitutional corruption has led to ideological litmus tests for judicial nominees, this essay first surveys the recent political landscape as it pertains to judicial appointments, focusing on the aftermath of the 2000 elections, the Senate confirmation stall now going on, and the rationales Democrats have offered for the stall. What is striking about those rationales is how explicit they have been about the politics of the matter: they make no pretense about defending the rule of law. The essay then outlines the relation between politics and law that our Constitution contemplates. It was not that politics was to have little or no place in our system of government; rather, it was that politics—the pursuit of interests through political means—was to be conducted within the bounds set by the Constitution, for if all were politics, nothing would be law. Next, the essay shows how we lived under that regime of law for 150 years, for the most part, before politics trumped law during the constitutional revolution of the New Deal. That entails showing how the Court’s rewriting of the Constitution, following President Roosevelt’s notorious Court-packing threat, effectively politicized the document, bringing us to a point today at which many think it proper that the Court should be “setting national policy,” as one leading Democrat recently put it. Given that view, it is hardly surprising that judicial nominees are now subjected to ideological scrutiny. Finally, the essay concludes by looking briefly at what must be done to restore the rule of law.

Before turning to those issues, however, a word should be said about why they have been cast already in partisan terms. It is not that Republicans have been faultless in recent years in the matter of judicial confirmations—far from it. But the present Senate stall, as we will see, is different in both degree and kind from earlier stalls, Republican or Democratic; the issue of ideology is now explicit, closely tracking generally understood party ideologies; and the divisions are now more sharply partisan than ever before, as witness the Senate Judiciary Committee’s recent 10–9 vote, along straight party lines, against sending to the full Senate the nomination of Judge Charles Pickering for a seat on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Moreover, when looked at closely, as we will do shortly, the rationales Democrats are offering for rejecting nominees, unlike those offered in the past by Republicans, tend to be considerably more political than legal. In a word (to be developed more fully below), Democrats today are tending far more than Republicans have in the past to look for result-oriented than for process-oriented judges. For those several reasons, therefore, this essay will continue to use the partisan terms of today’s debate, notwithstanding that there will always be individual exceptions and that Republicans, too, have more than once politicized the Constitution.

Ideological Litmus Tests

It was widely understood that the 2000
The Bush appellate court nominees who have waited the longest include some of the most accomplished lawyers in the nation.
Estrada came to America as a teenager, speaking virtually no English. Yet he graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Columbia College and at the top of his Harvard Law School class before clerking for Justice Anthony Kennedy. Like Roberts and McConnell, he too served in the Justice Department—as a federal prosecutor in New York and an attorney in the Solicitor General's Office in Washington. One could hardly find more qualified candidates for our appellate courts.

The reason such nominees have not had a hearing is because Democrats on the Senate Judiciary Committee have erected an ideological litmus test—which nominees like these cannot pass, presumably—and they are quite explicit about it. In fact, just after control of the Senate shifted to the Democrats, following the defection of Vermont Senator James Jeffords from the Republican Party, Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.), the new chairman of the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, announced a series of hearings to examine three questions: should “judicial ideology” play a role in judicial selection; should nominees have the burden of proving their fitness for office; and did the Rehnquist Court’s federalism jurisprudence give rise to a need for the Senate to change the selection process? The first of those hearings was held on June 26, 2001; the second on September 4; the third was postponed following the September 11 terrorist attacks and has yet to be held.

Plainly, those hearings were not aimed at moving the administration’s nominations along. On the contrary, their aim was to stall and to lay a foundation for continuing to stall. In fact, they have been accompanied by a number of quite public statements urging and rationalizing the stall. A week before the first hearing, for example, the Washington Post ran an op-ed by Edward Lazarus, once a clerk for Justice Harry A. Blackmun, urging the Senate to reject the “highly credentialed, conservative ideologues” Bush had nominated for the bench. Then on the day of that hearing the New York Times featured an op-ed by Senator Schumer himself, “Judging by Ideology.”

And on the Friday before the second hearing was to begin, right after Labor Day, the Washington Post ran another op-ed, this by Democratic Party elder Joseph Califano Jr., not-so-subtly titled “Yes, Litmus-Test Judges.”

In his article, Schumer defends ideological litmus testing by saying, candidly, that it is more honest than rejecting nominees for “small financial improprieties from long ago” when we all know that the real reason for rejection is ideological differences. He then gives us a glimpse of how testing would work. The importance of ideology in the confirmation decision can vary, Schumer writes, “depending on three factors: the extent to which the president himself makes his initial selections on the basis of a particular ideology, the composition of the courts at the time of the nomination and the political climate of the day.” Set aside how one applies those factors, their aim is clear: it is, explicitly, to keep conservatives like Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas from our courts. “The Supreme Court’s recent 5-4 decisions that constrain Congressional power,” Schumer says, “are probably the best evidence that the court is dominated by conservatives.” Thus, “tilting the court further to the right would push our court sharply away from the core values held by most of our country’s citizens.” Never mind, apparently, what the Constitution might say about the scope of congressional power—or anything else, for that matter. What counts, rather, is our citizens’ “core values.”

That glimpse of the Democratic agenda was embellished two months later in the Califano piece. Complaining that gridlock and big money have long kept Congress from legislating on a wide range of urgent matters, Califano notes that concerned citizens have been petitioning the courts with matters they once took to the political branches, making the courts “increasingly powerful architects of public policy.” Indeed, “who sits in federal district and appellate courts is more important than the struggle over the budget” or virtually
anything else going on today in Washington, Califano writes. For we have all learned, he
continues, “that what can’t be won in the legis-

dilative or executive may be achievable in a fed-
eral district court where a sympathetic judge
sits.” The Senate, therefore, needs to step in to
decide, on explicitly ideological grounds, who
will be “setting national policy” from the
bench.

That is a striking picture. Everything is
politics. Nothing is law. Judges don’t apply
law. “Sympathetic judges” make law, like so
many legislators, “setting national policy” in
the process. Meanwhile, our nominal legisla-
tors in the Senate are reduced to vetting our
true rulers. Interestingly, the Constitution,
which spells out the actual separation of
powers and the relation between politics and
law in our system of government, is men-
tioned not once in Califano’s piece.

Yet for all that, Califano’s picture is too
close to the truth to be ignored. He has put
his finger on just why the confirmation bat-
tles today loom so large. What he and his
Democratic colleagues have failed to do,
however, is explain, much less justify, this
flight from constitutional principle. To get at
that, we have to go further back.

Politics and Law

The main origins of the problem are in
the Progressive Era, when the social
engineers of the time sought often to do through
government—through the exer-
cise of political
power—what the
Constitution
plainly left to be
done, under the
rule of law, in the
private sector.
not say, “After periodic elections, those elected may do what they wish or pursue any end they wish or any end the people want.” On the contrary, it strictly limits, by law, the scope of politics. And it falls to the judiciary, the nonpolitical branch, to declare what the Constitution says that law and those limits are, thereby securing the rule of law.

The aim in all of this, then, is to constrain the rule of man—and politics—by the rule of law. The Framers understood that legitimacy begins with politics, with the people. Thus, “We the people . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution.” But once ratification—the initial political act—establishes the rule of law, that law constrains politics thereafter, at least in principle. And it is the nonpolitical judiciary that declares and enforces that law. It is essential, therefore, that the judiciary act nonpolitically—not from will or interest but from reason, according to law, consistent with the first principles of the system. If it does not, then to that extent the rule of law is undermined and politics trumps law.

Law Restrains Politics

That design held, in large part, for 150 years. Not that there were not attempts to upset it right from the start. Indeed, Alexander Hamilton’s 1791 Report on Manufactures, which Congress shelved, was a very early effort to establish a national industrial policy that would have politicized vast areas of American life. Despite the limits imposed by the enumeration of Congress’s powers, Hamilton argued that Congress had the power to act for the “general welfare,” a power that extended to “the general interests of learning, of agriculture, of manufacturing, and of commerce.” James Madison, the principal architect of the Constitution, responded sharply: “The federal Government has been hitherto limited to the specified powers, by the Greatest Champions for Latitude in expounding those powers. If not only the means, but the objects are unlimited, the parchment had better be thrown into the fire at once.”

Over the next 150 years we find numerous efforts to expand the business of government and undermine the rule of law, but those efforts were often checked in the political branches themselves—not simply on political but on constitutional grounds. An early example came, not surprisingly, from Madison: faced in 1794 with a bill appropriating $15,000 for the relief of French refugees fleeing an insurrection, he rose on the floor of the House to say that he could not “undertake to lay [his] finger on that article in the Federal Constitution which granted a right to Congress of expending, on objects of benevolence, the money of their constituents.” And when unconstitutional bills did get out of Congress, presidents ranging from Tyler, Polk, Pierce, and Buchanan, before the Civil War, to Arthur and Cleveland, after the war, stood athwart them. Thus, in 1887, 100 years after the Constitution was written, President Cleveland vetoed a bill appropriating $10,000 for seeds for Texas farmers suffering from a drought, saying, “I can find no warrant for such an appropriation in the Constitution.” Politics aside, Cleveland upheld the law. And the Court, too, could be found upholding the law without embarrassment. Thus, in the 1907 case of Kansas v. Colorado it wrote, “The proposition that there are legislative powers affecting the Nation as a whole which belong to, although not expressed in the grant of powers, is in direct conflict with the doctrine that this is a government of enumerated powers.”

In all three branches, then, we find numerous examples over this period of fidelity to principle, of law restraining politics. Although government did grow to some extent, it stayed, for the most part, within constitutional bounds. With the rise of progressivism, however, the pressure for active government began to mount as enlightened thought turned increasingly to state and federal legislatures to solve all manner of social and economic “problems.” As the political branches began to respond to such calls, often from narrow interests, it fell increasing-
ly to the courts alone to enforce constitutional limits. Often they did so, as in the 1905 case of Lochner v. New York, which found New York State's law limiting the hours bakers might work to be in violation of the Constitution's guarantee of freedom of contract. But sometimes they did not, as in the 1926 case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., which upheld comprehensive municipal zoning against the claims of private owners that their rights to use their property consistent with the rights of others were violated by the scheme.

Politics Trumps Law

After Franklin Roosevelt was elected, however, the focus of the political activists shifted to the federal government—and in short order, politics trumped law. With both political branches pressing for more government, one could say that it was only a matter of time until either the Supreme Court caved or nature took its course and the political branches conspired to seat sympathetic justices on the Court. Yet in either event—and both occurred—we would still be left with the basic question of constitutional legitimacy. Even if Roosevelt's Court-packing scheme had not cowed the Court, that is, or enhanced his ability to staff it with his own people, we would still need to ask: Did Congress, the executive, and the Court have it wrong for 150 years, when all thought, in essence, that the Constitution authorized only limited government? Or was the radically different doctrine the Court produced in 1937 and 1938 on the mark?

The revisions were accomplished in two main steps. First, in 1937 the Court effectively eviscerated the doctrine of enumerated powers, which the Framers had thought would be the principal restraint on federal power. Second, in 1938 the Court bifurcated the Bill of Rights—which was added to the Constitution to afford further protections against federal power and, after the Civil War Amendments were ratified, against state power as well—giving us a bifurcated theory of judicial review in the process.

The doctrine of enumerated powers can be reduced to a simple proposition: if you want to limit power, don't give it in the first place. The first words of Article I speak to the point: “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress...” By implication, not all powers were granted. Article I, section 8, enumerates Congress's main powers. The Tenth Amendment, the final documentary statement of the founding period, recapitulates the doctrine, as if for emphasis, making it explicit: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”

The 1937 Court eviscerated the doctrine of enumerated powers by reinterpreting two clauses of the Constitution, the General Welfare Clause and the Commerce Clause. Both were meant to be shields against power. The Court turned them into swords of power. The General Welfare Clause was meant to be a restraint on the spending power. Congress could spend for enumerated ends, but that spending had to serve the general welfare as distinct from particular or sectional welfare. In particular, Madison, Jefferson, and others insisted, against Hamilton, that Congress had no independent power to spend for the general welfare, for that would have rendered pointless the restraint afforded by enumeration. As South Carolina's William Drayton observed in 1828, “If Congress can determine what constitutes the General Welfare and can appropriate money for its advancement, where is the limitation to carrying into execution whatever can be effected by money?” Yet in 1936, in United States v. Butler, the Court sided with Hamilton, even if its opinion on
the question was not central to the case. The next year, however, in Helvering v. Davis, the Court elevated that dicta to “law.” Congress was now free to spend on any end it thought served the “general welfare.” The modern welfare state was thus unleashed.

The Commerce Clause was also meant primarily to be a restraint—but on the states. Under the Articles of Confederation, states were erecting tariffs and other protectionist measures that had begun to interfere with the free flow of commerce among them. In fact, one of the principal reasons the Framers met to draft a new constitution was to address that problem. They did so through the Commerce Clause, which gave Congress the power to regulate—or make regular—commerce among the states. And that is how the clause was read in 1824 in the first great Commerce Clause case, Gibbons v. Ogden. It was not read as giving Congress a power to regulate, for any reason, anything that “affected” interstate commerce, which in principle is everything. Yet that is how the 1937 Court read the clause in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.—and with that the modern regulatory state was unleashed.

After those two decisions, Congress’s redistributive and regulatory powers were plenary, in effect, as courts no longer asked that most basic of constitutional questions: Does Congress have the authority to do what it is doing? Yet individuals might still raise rights against the exercise of those powers. In 1938, therefore, the Court attended to that impediment to active government in the notorious filled-milk case, United States v. Carolene Products Co. Famous “footnote four” of the opinion distinguished two kinds of rights and two levels of judicial review. If a measure implicated “fundamental rights” like speech or voting—rights associated with the political process—the Court would exercise “strict scrutiny” and the measure would likely be found unconstitutional. Those distinctions are nowhere to be found in the Constitution, of course. They were created from whole cloth to make the world safe for the expansive programs of the New Deal. Limited government would soon be a thing of the past as one program after another poured through the openings the Court had created.

A Court without a Compass

The constitutional revolution the New Deal Court wrought was a textbook example of politics trumping law—not on a small scale, as when a judge ignores the law in a narrow case to reach a popular result, but on a massive, structural scale. The very theory and purpose of the Constitution were upended. The American people had delegated limited powers to the national government. The Court rendered those powers effectively unlimited. The people restrained the exercise of that power and, later, the power of the states through a Bill of Rights, making it clear in the process that the enumeration of certain rights was not to be construed as denying or disparaging other, unenumerated rights. The Court rendered that design unintelligible. In a word, heeding the politics of the day, the Court turned a document authorizing limited government into one authorizing effectively unlimited government, making a mockery of the rule of law.

We have lived under that regime for over 60 years now, and the confusions inherent in it are everywhere. Take just one aspect, the bifurcated judicial scrutiny theory that emerged from Carolene Products. It turns out that gender discrimination required a richer theory, so the Court invented mid-level scrutiny. But when the “must-carry” provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 were before the Court, a fourth level of scrutiny had to be invented. Now we have “minimal” scrutiny for ordinary commercial transactions, “relaxed” scrutiny for broadcast tele-
vision, “heightened” scrutiny for cable television, and “strict” scrutiny for newspapers. Does anyone know what any of that means? One is reminded of nothing so much as medieval geocentric Ptolemaics drawing epicycle upon epicycle to ward off the onslaught of the heliocentric Copernicans.

But that is only one of the confusions of the body of thought today called “constitutional law.” A brief overview of the past 60 years brings out others, related often to the role judges now play. Start with the surfeit of federal and state legislation the New Deal revolution unleashed, most of it aimed at solving all manner of “social problems”—there being, in principle, no end to such problems. Reflecting the hubris that has always attended central planning, those schemes—whether regulating commerce, agriculture, labor, retirement, land use, education, medicine, campaign finance, and on and on—have grown ever more complex, often because they generate unintended consequences that require still more regulation, the planners claim. The result is the modern administrative state—massive and effectively unaccountable—and a body of “law” that in fact is policy, reflecting the will of the political forces that have triumphed on a given issue on a given day. It is politics as law in its purest form, with almost no subject beyond its reach.

Much of that legislation and regulation has ended up in the courts, of course, with judges asked to make sense of often inconsistent or incoherent policy—fairly inviting them to be parties to the legislation and hence policymakers themselves. To be sure, not everything the post-New Deal courts have done has reflected that kind of ungrounded “activism.” In fact, in many cases the Supreme Court has been “active” in precisely the way it should be—protecting individuals against overweening government, but doing so on the basis of law. Nowhere has that proper form of activism been more in order than in the decisions that brought an end at last to the legal regime known as Jim Crow. Since the ratification of the Civil War Amendments, the Constitution has been colorblind. It does not permit governments to discriminate among citizens except on grounds that are narrowly tailored to serve the mission at issue. That is what equal protection is all about. It is a far cry from—indeed, it is the very opposite of—the kinds of preference schemes that have been sanctioned subsequent to the abolition of Jim Crow.

That brings us, however, to what is, without doubt, the most confused area of post–New Deal constitutional law—constitutional rights. No longer willing to say that Congress has no authority over subjects like education, labor, or medicine, the Court has limited itself to parsing regulatory language, as noted above, or to adjudicating endless claims about rights, especially as generated by multiplying legislative schemes. Yet it has adjudicated disputes over rights without a compass or a theory of the matter. At times it has ignored rights plainly recognized by the Constitution. At other times it has discovered rights in “penumbras” and “emanations” or by consulting “evolving social values,” which conflates rights theory and value theory and hence different domains of morality—an infirmity that plagues its distinction between “fundamental” and “nonfundamental” rights as well. The result is an ad hoc body of “constitutional rights,” nothing approaching the coherent theory that stands behind and informs the Constitution.
When government was limited, the Court to some extent could get away without having articulated the Constitution's underlying rights theory, because with less government there was less opportunity for conflict between government actions and individual rights. When government is ubiquitous, however, conflicts are as well.

The problem antedates the New Deal, of course. In fact, it arose seminally in 1873 in the infamous Slaughter House Cases, which upheld the right of a state-authored monopoly to preclude individuals from pursuing a lawful trade. The decision effectively eviscerated the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause, which was meant to be the principal font of rights against the states. Thereafter the Court would try to do under the Due Process Clause and, later, the Equal Protection Clause what should have been done under the more substantive, better understood Privileges or Immunities Clause. For some 65 years, the Court did that job more or less well—correctly in cases like Lochner, incorrectly in cases like Euclid—but never with a sure grasp of the matter. With the Carolene Products overlay and its implicit conflation of rights and values, however, the Court sank into hopelessly confused talk of interests rising to the level of rights, evolving social values, and value-laden balancing tests.

Yet those who drafted and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment had it basically right. They harked back to the natural rights tradition that led to our founding document, the Declaration of Independence; to the Constitution, which was written to give force to the Declaration's moral and political theory; and to the common law that had captured that moral theory to a substantial extent. They understood that we are born with our rights, we do not get them from government; that when we created government we gave it certain powers, thereby giving up certain rights; and that we retained the rest of our rights, as the Ninth Amendment says. Those are our natural rights, the rights we had against each other, prior to the creation of government, all of which can be reduced, conceptually, to "property"—broadly understood as "Lives, Liberties and Estates," as John Locke put it. Exercising those rights, we can pursue happiness, creating all manner of contractual relationships in the process. Thus the two great fonts of rights—property, broadly understood, and contract.

The old common law judges generally understood those elementary principles. So did the Founders and the Framers and many judges thereafter, including the four Slaughter House dissenters, the lone dissenter in Plessy v. Ferguson, the 1896 decision that upheld the appalling "separate but equal" doctrine, and Thurgood Marshall in his brief in Brown v. Board of Education, the 1954 decision that overturned the application of that doctrine to public schools. They are not terribly difficult principles. Justice Bushrod Washington, riding circuit, stated them simply in 1823 in Corfield v. Coryell, considered at the time to be the authoritative interpretation of Article IV's Privileges and Immunities Clause. Contending that it would be "more tedious than difficult" to enumerate the rights protected by the clause, Washington offered illustrative categories, such as "protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness"—rights "which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign." Notice that no "welfare rights" are included in those categories—"rights" to education, health care, subsidies, import restraints, and the like. Not only are such "entitlements" no part of the rights the Constitution protects; as a corollary, when they are created, by statute, they conflict with constitutional rights, rights to liberty and property. Thus, such statutes, if federal, are unconstitutional because unauthorized under the doctrine of enumerated powers; but they are also uncon-
stitutional, whether federal or state, because they trample constitutional rights, much as a statute restricting speech would be unconstitutional, and for the same reason.

If we are going to take rights seriously, then, we have to do the serious intellectual work that is required to clarify the Constitution's structure of rights. For as the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments make clear, the rights "in" the Constitution are not limited to those the document plainly enumerates—speech, religion, property, and the like—although even those rights require interpretation and integration within the Constitution's larger scheme of rights. One could begin that work by noticing how Washington uses the term "fundamental" in the quote above. In *Carolene Products* the term is used in an evaluative sense—to distinguish more important from less important rights—reflecting the subjective values of the justices who wrote the opinion. Washington, by contrast, uses the term in an analytical or logical sense—to distinguish rights that are basic, like property and contract, from those that are derivative. Both sorts of rights are important, but some are generic, or "fundamental," whereas others are derived from those basic rights. That is the approach to rights—recognizing that they are rooted not in will or values or politics but in reason—that is required if the theory of rights that informs the Constitution is to be given life and constitutional law given legitimacy.

Unfortunately, we are very far today from that understanding. Post-New Deal liberals, driven by a progressive political agenda, have tended to see rights either as products of transient legislative majorities or, when that route failed, as products of judicial discovery—with liberal judges drawing not from the original understanding of constitutional rights, which seldom served their political ends, but from the value-laden criteria noted above. The judicial activism that resulted, with judges seeming at times to draw rights from thin air, led to a backlash among conservatives. Rather than challenge the New Deal's constitutional revolution, however, they generally limited their criticism to the rights activism of the courts, which left them free to pursue their own political agenda through the political branches, consistent with the New Deal Court's democratization of the Constitution. Thus, for conservatives, if a right was not clearly "in" the Constitution, it did not exist. It fell to legislatures, they argued, to create such rights.

Both sides in that battle of 40 years and more are wrong. Liberals are wrong to have unleashed the political branches originally, right to turn to the courts for protection from the ensuing majoritarian tyranny, but wrong to ask them to consult anything but law, anything but the theory of rights that informs the Constitution. Liberals are wrong, that is, to ask the courts to ignore rights plainly in the Constitution, yet find rights nowhere to be found, even among our unenumerated rights. But conservatives too are wrong for buying into the New Deal Court's machinations, right to criticize the Court for its subsequent rights activism, but wrong to limit constitutional rights to those fairly clearly "in" the document. Conservatives, after all, can hardly ignore or disparage the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments, as many do, and still call themselves "originalists." As for legislatures creating rights against majoritarian tyranny, neither history nor the theory of the Founders supports that belief. It falls to the judiciary, as Madison said, to be "an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the Legislative or Executive."

Thus, to summarize, the Constitution today stands thoroughly politicized. Because constitutional principles limiting federal power to enumerated ends have been ignored—at least until very recently, and then in a very limited way—the scope of federal power and the subjects open to federal concern are determined now by politics alone. Because the rights that would limit the exercise of that power are grounded increasingly not in the Constitution's first principles but in the subjective understandings of judges about evolving social values, they too increasingly reflect the politics of the day. Thus, the rule of law is now largely the rule of politics.
What Is to Be Done?

Is it any wonder, therefore, that judicial selection has become politicized too? If judges “set national policy,” as Califano says, we should know their policy preferences. If judges find rights through their understanding of evolving social values, we should know whether judicial nominees reflect “the core values held by most of our country’s citizens,” as Schumer says. If judges, in short, are to be handmaidens in the business of lawmaking—just another class of politician—then by all means scrutinize them on political grounds. That is what we come to when we abandon the rule of law.

Indeed, it is not too much to say that the modern Democratic vision comes down to this: We Democrats, speaking for all Americans, have a political agenda in which all of government needs to be engaged. Congress, the executive, and the states need to be formulating, enacting, and executing measures to solve the people’s problems, for modern government is a service industry, with citizens as its customers. When recalcitrant political forces frustrate that effort, courts need to step in to complete the job. If states are not moving fast enough to reform abortion laws, for example, the Court should be creative and find a way to accomplish that.46 If the states or Congress are unable to enact affirmative action measures, or if citizens in a state should use the initiative process to end preference programs there, here too the courts need to help.47 We all need to work together, modern Democrats believe. Thus, when Congress failed “to enact sensible public health policies regarding tobacco to protect our children from nicotine pushers,” Califano writes, approvingly, that “sent anti-smoking advocates to federal court to draft a settlement agreement with provisions that read like sections of a federal statute.” Given that view of activist government, it is hardly surprising that Califano concludes, “[T]he battle over who fills the record number of judicial vacancies has taken on an importance unimaginable just a generation ago.”48

But too often Republicans are little better, responding with a message that is less than clear at best, at worst is flatly contrary to the Constitution. To be sure, the more principled members of the party have stood sometimes for constitutional fidelity and “judicial restraint”—not the bogus restraint of deference to the political branches, which the New Deal Court indulged in the face of a duty to act, but the proper restraint that instructs judges to apply rather than make law, even when doing so entails actively opposing the political branches. More often, however, Republicans come across as timid Democrats. Having bought into the New Deal’s surrender of limited government, they are left to spar with Democrats over the scope of constitutional rights. Without a sure grasp of the subject, however, they simply flail at the judicial lawmaking that discovers those rights, whether correctly or not, thinking it perfectly proper if the same rights are created by legislatures. Thus, they come across not as constitutional libertarians but as the true democrats, even if ours is not a true democracy but a constitutional republic.

Yet constitutional fidelity means saying, candidly, that most of what the government is now doing is unconstitutional because beyond its authority. That is not easy to say in today’s political climate, of course, and most Republicans, for that reason, have been reluctant to say it. But if the party that purports to be the party of limited government will not say it, who will? To be sure, the deeper problem is that the doctrine of enumerated powers, and Madison’s promise in Federalist 45 that the powers of the federal government would be “few and defined,” are not only quaint and all but unknown among the public—to say nothing of Congress—but largely unpopular. On national holidays paens are sung to the Constitution and to the virtues of limited government, but those virtues are honored today mostly in the breach.

Indeed, what is it that seems to be exercising Senator Schumer—so much so that he called for hearings on that issue alone? It is the Court’s recent yet limited efforts to
restore constitutional principle, its 5-4 decisions “that constrain Congressional power.”

Echoing that concern in an op-ed in the Washington Post last January was Abner J. Mikva, who has served in all three branches of the federal government, most recently as counsel to President Clinton. While urging the Senate not to fill any Supreme Court vacancy that might arise until after the 2004 elections, Mikva listed first among his complaints against today’s Court that it “has imposed limits on what areas Congress can regulate.” It is as if the doctrine of enumerated powers—the very centerpiece of the Constitution—were utterly foreign to Schumer, Mikva, and the rest.

Yet the Rehnquist Court’s recent federalism jurisprudence has hardly rolled the clock back to 1936, much less reinstated the Madisonian vision. On the contrary, the two cases that most directly revive the doctrine of enumerated powers, United States v. Lopez71 in 1995 and United States v. Morrison72 in 2000, barely move the ball. In Lopez, the Court found that Congress had exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause when it criminalized possession of a gun near a school, leaving it to the state to address such issues. In Morrison, the Court found again that Congress had exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause when it criminalized a child sex offender’s internet contact with a minor, thereby removing the case from state jurisdiction.

Plainly, the measures at issue in both cases were popular. Should the Senate require that a nominee reflect our citizens’ “core values,” as Schumer insists, constitutional principles notwithstanding? If so, where would the Schumers, Califanos, and Mikvas want a nominee to stand on an issue like flag burning? Surely, popular sentiment supports legislation banning that. Do they? Democrats have usually opposed such legislation. Yet Justice Scalia—the kind of jurist Schumer expressly rejects—threw out both state and federal statutes prohibiting flag desecration—on constitutional grounds.74

Decisions like those aside, when confirmation questions move from powers to rights, around which so much modern constitutional controversy has swirled, the difficulties only mount for Republican nominees. For again, their antipathy to the rights activism of liberal judges has left many of them reluctant to delve into the first principles of the matter, preferring instead to see judicial restraint as tantamount to deferring to the political branches. Unfortunately, their unwillingness to recognize any rights “in” the Constitution except those that are expressly there places them on the wrong side not only of popular opinion but of the Constitution itself.

The problem was brought to the fore very recently as the Senate Judiciary Committee was considering the nomination of Judge D. Brooks Smith for a seat on the Third Circuit. In a May 10, 2002, letter to Smith, Senator Schumer pressed the judge to answer not simply whether he believes the Supreme Court was right in Griswold v. Connecticut,75 the 1965 decision that threw out a state statute prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to married couples, but why the decision was right or wrong. Smith’s previous answers had failed to satisfy Schumer because they merely restated the law that flowed from Griswold while giving no indication of how Smith might have derived the right of privacy, the right at issue in the case, much less apply it to other cases. As Schumer put it: “I am interested in how you personally read and interpret the Constitution.”76

When faced with questions like that,
Republican nominees have too often responded by saying simply that they would apply the law. That would not do here, of course, for as Schumer went on to say, he was asking Smith to treat Griswold as a case of first impression. If he were sitting on the Supreme Court, how would he have decided the case, and why? Were Smith to answer by saying that he would follow the law, that would seem to imply that he would uphold the state statute forbidding the sale of contraceptives. But Smith had already said that he had no quarrel with Griswold—"I have always believed there is a right to privacy in the Constitution." 77 Schumer wanted to know how Smith found that right to privacy. Thus pressed, Republican nominees must do the work mentioned earlier. Doing so, they can take no guidance from Justice Scalia's thoughts two years ago in a similar case, Troxel v. Granville, 78 which only illustrates the problem. In Troxel, the grandparent visitation case out of Washington State, the Court found an unenumerated right of fit parents to direct the upbringing of their children, a right that trumped the state law at issue, which had authorized state judges to grant visitation rights to grandparents and others, over the objections of the parents. In dissent, Scalia said that although the parental right was among the unalienable rights proclaimed by the Declaration of Independence and the unenumerated rights retained pursuant to the Ninth Amendment, "the Constitution's refusal to 'deny or disparage [such] rights is far removed from affirming any one of them, and even farther removed from authorizing judges to identify what they might be, and to enforce the judges' list against laws duly enacted by the people." 79 Going to the heart of the matter, Scalia concludes, "I do not believe that the power which the Constitution confers upon a judge entitles her to deny legal effect to laws that (in my view) infringe upon what is (in my view) that unenumerated right" (original emphasis). 80

There, in a nutshell, is the judicial deference to the political branches that has robbed the Constitution of its rich natural rights heritage and denied effect to the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments—surely parts of the Constitution as much as any other of its parts. Originalism aside, there are at least two additional problems with Scalia's approach. First, the Constitution does not "refuse" to deny or disbar unenumerated rights. Rather, it fairly asserts their existence by instructing us—and judges in particular—that the enumeration of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disbar other rights. That is the natural reading. Second, not only does Scalia defer to democratic majorities to define and enforce our unenumerated rights—unlike our enumerated rights—but he both misunderstands and undermines the very idea of a right. Rights, by definition, are asserted defensively—not when one is in the majority but when one is in the minority, against a majoritarian threat. Scalia claims that fit parents have a right to direct the upbringing of their children. Yet he also says that it is up to the legislature to make such rights explicit. Well, the Washington legislature did act. But it said that there are not any such rights. So there are such rights, Scalia says, but by his interpretive methodology there are not such rights. He cannot have it both ways. It cannot be that we have a constitutional right until a state legislature says otherwise. His approach is tantamount to reducing the Ninth Amendment to a nullity. In fact, taken to its logical conclusion, it puts even enumerated rights at risk, since even they require judicial interpretation. After all, the right to burn the flag, which Scalia upheld, is not to be found "in" the Constitution—except by inference. Where then did Scalia find it when the legislatures—state and federal—had spoken otherwise?

What conservatives of the judicial restraint school have to come to grips with, then, is the full richness of the Constitution, including its natural rights foundations. The Founders did that without embarrassment. And they understood further, with Madison, that the courts were to be an "impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive" branches. To play that role, however, judges have got to
understand the underlying theory of rights. They have got to be able to show, for example, that Griswold does not imply Roe, and just why there is all the difference in the world between the two cases.

This is not the place to detail that distinction. It is the place to say, however, that once the Constitution is taken seriously, once judicial nominees are able to show the Schumers of the world that they take both individual liberty and majoritarian tyranny seriously, they will be in a good position to turn the tables on those selective libertarians of the left who suddenly lose their love of liberty when contemplating the latest Washington scheme for doing good. If we are going to take the Constitution seriously, we have to take it seriously in its entirety—both its limits on power, through enumeration, and its limits on the exercise of power, through both enumerated and unenumerated rights.

**Conclusion**

It is hardly clear, however, that Democrats want to take the Constitution seriously. After all, constitutional corruption has well served their political agenda of active government. But neither is it entirely clear that Republicans want to take the Constitution seriously, for they too have their own agenda for active government. If the Senate remains evenly divided, and Senate Democrats continue their ideological litmus testing, Republican nominees will have only two choices—duck or fight. They can respond evasively to senators’ questions, hoping thereby to squeak through the process by garnering enough votes from Democratic “moderates”—an increasingly rare breed. That strategy has two disadvantages: it will likely work best only for those nominees who would be disinclined to disturb the status quo in any event; and by default it cedes the moral high ground to the other side. But for those who care deeply about restoring the Constitution and the rule of law it establishes, there is only one choice—to defend our first principles as a nation. That strategy has two advantages: it

seizes the moral high ground from those most responsible for corrupting the Constitution, and it brings to the nation the civics lesson it so sorely needs.

**Notes**

This essay is a slightly revised version of an essay that appears currently in *Nexus: A Journal of Opinion*, vol. 7 (2002), published by the Chapman University School of Law.


7. A judicial emergency vacancy is defined as “[a]ny vacancy in a district court where weighted filings are in excess of 600 per judgeship; or any vacancy in existence more than 18 months where weighted filings are between 430 to 600 per judgeship; or any court with more than one authorized judgeship and only one active judge; and any vacancy in a court of appeals where adjusted filings per panel are in excess of 700; or any vacancy in existence more than 18 months where adjusted filings are between 500 to 700 per panel.”


12. 1 Cranch (5 U.S. 137) (1803).


14. Id. at 247.


17. 4 Annals of Cong. 170 (1794).


19. 18 Cong. Rec. 1875 (1887).

20. 206 U.S. 46, 89 (1907).


22. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).

23. Between 1937 and 1941, Roosevelt was able to appoint seven justices.


25. Thus, in 1935 President Roosevelt wrote to the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee: “I hope your committee will not permit doubts as to constitutionality, however reasonable, to block the suggested legislation.” “Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Rep. Samuel B. Hill” (July 6, 1935) in 4 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 91-92 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1938). And three decades later, Rexford G. Tugwell, one of the principal architects of the New Deal, could be found writing, “To the extent that these new social virtues [i.e., New Deal policies] developed, they were tortured interpretations of a document [i.e., the Constitution] intended to prevent them.” Rexford G. Tugwell, “A Center Report: Rewriting the Constitution,” Center Magazine, March 1968, at 20. That is a fairly clear admission that the New Deal was skating not simply on thin ice, but on no constitutional ice at all.


31. Drayton continued: “How few objects are there which money cannot accomplish!... Can it be conceived that the great and wise men who devised our Constitution... should have failed so egregiously... as to grant a power which rendered restriction upon power practically unavailing?” 4 Reg. Deb. 1632-34 (1828). Madison made a similar point on several occasions. See, e.g., James Madison, “Report on Resolutions,” in 6 The Writings of James Madison 357 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1899) (“Money cannot be applied to the general welfare otherwise than by an application of it to some particular measure conducive to the general welfare. Whenever, therefore, money has been raised by the general authority, and is to be applied to a particular measure, a question arises whether the particular measure be within the enumerated authorities vested in Congress. If it be, the money requisite for it may be applied to it; if it be not, no such application can be made”) (emphasis in original). And Jefferson also addressed the issue. See, e.g., “Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin” (June 16, 1817) in Writings of Thomas Jefferson 91 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1899) (“[O]ur tenet ever was, and, indeed, it is almost the only landmark which now divides the federalists from the republicans, that Congress had not unlimited powers to provide for the general welfare, but were restrained to those specifically enumerated; and that, as it was never meant they should... raise money for purposes which the enumeration did not place under their action; consequently, that the specification of powers is a limitation of the purpose for which they may raise money.”) See generally Charles Warren, Congress as Santa Claus: Or, National Donations and the General Welfare Clause of the Constitution (reprint 1978) (1932).
32. 262 U.S. 1, 65–66 (1936).
33. 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937).
34. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
35. See the concurrence of Justice William Johnson in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 1 (1824): “If there was any one object riding over every other in the adoption of the constitution, it was to keep the commercial intercourse among the States free from all invidious and partial restraints.” Id. at 231.
37. 9 Wheat (22 U.S.) 1 (1824).
38. 301 U.S. 619 (1937); see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
39. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
40. Id. at 152. For a devastating critique of the politics behind the Carolene Products case, see Geoffrey P. Miller, “The True Story of Carolene Products,” 1987 Sup. Ct. Rev. 397.
41. See, e.g., Lawrence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 816 (2000). Commenting on the Court’s modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Tribe writes: “The Court’s application of its substantial effect and aggregation principles in the period between 1937 and 1995, combined with its deference to congressional findings, placed it in the increasingly untenable position of claiming the power to strike down invocations of the Commerce Clause, while at the same time applying a set of doctrines that made it virtually impossible actually to exercise this power.”
42. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), the Virginia Military Academy case in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg invoked “heightened scrutiny” (id. at 555) and “skeptical scrutiny” (id. at 531).
47. The example with the most far-reaching political consequences, of course, was the abortion decision, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) See infra note 66.
52. 16 Wall (83 U.S.) 36 (1873).
54. Edward S. Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law 26 (1955) (“The notion that the common law embodied right reason furnished from the fourteenth century its chief claim to be regarded as higher law.”).
57. 163 U.S. 537, 559–60 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
58. For a discussion of this whole line of argument, see Clarence Thomas, “The Higher Law Background of the Privileges or Immunities

59. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).

60. Id. at 551–52.


65. 1 Annals of Cong. 457 (1789).

66. On March 8, 1993, shortly before President Clinton nominated her for the Supreme Court, then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg gave the Madison Lecture at the New York University School of Law, speculating that the nation might have been spared the ensuing political maelstrom had the Roe Court been more “measured” in its opinion and allowed greater latitude for state reforms that even then were taking place. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “Speaking in a Judicial Voice,” 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1185 (1992). For my critique of that speech, see Roger Pilon, “Ginsburg’s Troubling Constitution,” Wall St. J., June 17, 1993, at A10.


68. Califano, supra note 11.

69. Schumer, supra note 10.


74. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); United States v. Eichman 496 U.S. 310 (1990). Justice John Paul Stevens, ordinarily thought to be the most liberal member of the present Court, voted to uphold both statutes.

75. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).


77. Id.

78. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).

79. Id. at 91, n. 71.

80. Id. at 92, n. 72.

81. See Corwin, supra note 54.